finding 16-year-old codefendant’s sentence of four years’ imprisonment was not disproportionate to defendant’s death sentence where codefendant was ineligible for that sentence
How later courts described this case
- finding 16-year-old codefendant’s sentence of four years’ imprisonment was not disproportionate to defendant’s death sentence where codefendant was ineligible for that sentence
- polygraph results usurp the function of the jury due to risk that jury will find results conclusive
- where the State deliberately destroyed potentially discoverable memoranda of pretrial statements by the State’s key witnesses
- defense may inspect notes pertaining to statements of specific witness after in camera inspection to excise privileged matter
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Rutledge v. State, 1987 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 4672 (1987)
The case of People v. Szabo, 94 Ill.2d 327, 68 Ill.Dec. 935, 447 N.E.2d 193 (1983), cited by appellant, is clearly distinguishable.
The opinion
JUSTICE SIMON, specially concurring:
I concur in the entire opinion except for the conclusion that it was not permissible for Szabo to introduce the results of polygraph examinations at the sentencing hearing. Fairness and justice require that a defendant in a capital case have the broadest opportunity to introduce and rely upon any evidence which may tend to show why he should escape execution.
Although I approve of the holding in People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225 , that the results of a polygraph examination are not admissible evidence in a criminal trial, the legislature has determined that the courts should relax the rules of evidence in conducting post-conviction sentencing hearings where the prosecutor seeks the death penalty. Section 9 — 1(e) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that either the defendant or the State may present any evidence relevant to certain factors in aggravation and in mitigation at a sentencing hearing “regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(e).) At the sentencing proceeding in the instant case the court permitted the prosecution to present both impermissible hearsay and evidence of the defendant’s bad character, none of which would have been admissible as substantive evidence at a criminal trial. (See also People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145, 166 (court considers testimony offered by policeman in a separate proceeding).) The accuracy and veracity of these types of evidence is no greater than the reliability of polygraph evidence. Moreover, evidence of the defendant’s bad character is at least as likely as polygraph evidence to have a prejudicial and unreasonable influence on the jury. I do not understand how we can hold that a sentencing court in a death case must exclude relevant polygraph evidence while at the same time recognizing that other types of equally questionable evidence may be admitted in such a proceeding.
The majority’s treatment of the polygraph evidence is not only inconsistent with the legislature’s policy, it also denies the defendant due process of law. In a proceeding that will determine whether a defendant should live or die, fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be precluded from no opportunity to present relevant evidence to show why he should live, notwithstanding the rules of evidence ordinarily applicable in criminal cases. (Cf. Green v. Georgia (1979), 442 U.S. 95 , 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 , 99 S. Ct. 2150 (exclusion of reliable hearsay in death penalty proceeding under State’s rules of evidence violates due process).) The polygraph evidence introduced by the defendant at the sentencing hearing was at least as reliable as some of the evidence presented by the prosecution at the same hearing. Even though the reasoning in Baynes would prevent the use of polygraph evidence by the State at some stages of the proceedings, I feel that the defendant should be able to use it in a death penalty hearing subject to attack by the State upon its reliability.