The opinion
REGAN, J.
I dissent.
Petitioner is a licensed cosmetologist who also holds a barbershop certificate, which certificate licenses him to operate a barbershop. He is not a licensed barber and thus may not personally engage in the practice of barbering. Petitioner operates a barbershop, employing licensed barbers, under the name of “Doyle’s Barber Shop,” which shop is not a licensed eosmetological establishment,
*467 Section 7330 of the Business and Professions Code defines a cosmetologist as "any person who engages in the practice of cosmetology in a licensed cosmetological establishment . . . . ” (Italics added.) Petitioner testified: "I can’t work in the cosmetology anymore because I’m allergic to the solutions, and my hands break out, and I can’t work at it anymore.” He further testified that his activities in the barbershop arc limited to "working as a haircutter,” cutting the hair of men, women and children.
I interpret section 6522 of the Business and Professions Code to authorize a licensed cosmetologist (person practicing beauty culture) to cut the hair when the hair cutting is incident to the practice of cosmetology. It does not authorize one not licensed as a barber to engage in the practice of barbering. I find that petitioner was licensed to cut hair in a licensed cosmetological establishment and, acting as such, was outside the jurisdiction of the Board of Barber Examiners. However, when he chose to perform as he did outside a licensed cosmetological establishment he was no longer clothed with the protection of his license. The Board of Barber Examiners, which is authorized to regulate barbershops and barbering, is empowered to discipline for violations of the Barber Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6596.) The actions of petitioner constitute such a violation.
The result of the majority decision in this case is not in the public interest. It will sanction the practice of haircutting in licensed barbershops by cosmetologists who are not trained for this purpose.
I would reverse the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 12, 1967. Began, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 31, 1967. Traynor, C. J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.