explaining that because Philadelphia’s “purported liability was merely derivative of the contractor’s negligence,” Philadelphia was immune under “the ‘any other person’ language of § 8541”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that because Philadelphia’s “purported liability was merely derivative of the contractor’s negligence,” Philadelphia was immune under “the ‘any other person’ language of § 8541”
- injury was caused by unsafe condition of scaffolding
- injury caused by unsafe condition of scaffolding
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Canizares v. City of Philadelphia, 20 Pa. D. & C.4th 397 (1993)
The plaintiffs contend that Maloney is distinguishable in that the instant case involves real property (the trough), and Maloney involves personal property (the scaffold).
The opinion
*645 Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Colins:
I dissent. I believe that under the unique facts of this case, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the trier of fact to conclude that the scaffolding in question qualified as a fixture and, therefore, could properly have been considered real estate for purposes of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.