holding that to determine if an adequate factual basis for a plea was provided, "the court may consider a wide range of information sources, including all testimony at the plea and sentencing hearings, the presentence report, as well as other sources unique to a particular case"
How later courts described this case
- holding that to determine if an adequate factual basis for a plea was provided, "the court may consider a wide range of information sources, including all testimony at the plea and sentencing hearings, the presentence report, as well as other sources unique to a particular case"
- explaining that the purpose of Rule 3:22-4 is to help cases reach “finality” and that, “[w]ithout procedural rules requiring the consolidation of issues, litigation would continue indefinitely in a disconnected and piecemeal fashion”
- recognizing that under extraordinary circumstances, a court's improper acceptance of a guilty plea may constitute an illegal sentence within the meaning of R. 3:22-12 when it implicates constitutional issues
- noting that the challenge to the factual basis of defendant’s plea was not of “constitutional dimension” and did not give rise to an illegal sentence, and that imposition of the maximum sentence under the plea agreement did “not rise to the level of a constitutional violation justifying the use of exception [72. 3:22-]4(c)” or R. 3:22-12
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. DiFrisco, 187 N.J. 156 (2006)
” Ibid. Moreover, this appeal is distinguishable from those cases in which the Rule properly has been found to bar a petition.
The opinion
*590 STEIN, J.,
concurring in judgment.
I concur only in the judgment of the Court. In view of the majority opinion’s thoughtful and painstaking discussion of the merits, ante at 581-583, 601 A.2d at 206-207, the opinion’s assertion that “we do not reach the merits of [petitioner’s] claim,” ante at 589, 601 A. 2d at 210, is indeed perplexing. When, as in this case, the merits must be addressed to determine whether any of the relevant exceptions to Rule 3:22-4 is applicable, the denial of post-conviction relief should be based both on the Rule and on the determination that defendant has established neither fundamental injustice nor a denial of his constitutional rights.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
For affirmance — None.