stating that our jurisdiction is by way of certiorari or appeal where the petitioner also had standing to bring an appeal and where the lower court was without jurisdiction to hear a claim or issue a particular remedy
How later courts described this case
- stating that our jurisdiction is by way of certiorari or appeal where the petitioner also had standing to bring an appeal and where the lower court was without jurisdiction to hear a claim or issue a particular remedy
- a writ of certiorari granted where lower court did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim or to issue a particular type of remedy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ANNABELLE Clinton Imber, Justice, concurring. I join the majority opinion in concluding that the circuit court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in entering its order requiring the Commission to pay attorney’s fees to Mr. Stidham. It is abundantly clear from statutory provisions governing the Arkansas Public Defender Commission that the Arkansas General Assembly has created a specific waiver of immunity solely for the payment of attorney’s fees for appointed counsel who defend indigents in cases punishable by incarceration. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-212 (a)(l) (“The Commission is authorized to pay for certain expenses regarding the defense of indigents.”); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-213 (a)(1)(A) (“Any person charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment who desires to be represented by an appointed attorney ...”); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-306 (“The public defender ... shall ... [d]efend indigents ... in all felony, misdemeanor, juvenile, guardianship, and mental health cases, all traffic cases punishable by incarceration, and all contempt proceedings punishable by incarceration.”).
In postconviction proceedings under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, the petitioner’s appointed attorney is no longer representing an indigent person “charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment.” The petitioner ■— the former defendant — has already been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Furthermore, by filing a petition for postconviction relief, which amounts to a collateral attack upon the judgment of conviction, the petitioner has assumed the burden of proving any claims asserted under Rule 37. Helton v. State, 325 Ark. 140 , 924 S.W.2d 239 (1996); Flaherty v. State, 297 Ark. 198 , 761 S.W.2d 167 (1988). Thus, petitioner’s appointed attorney in a Rule 37 proceeding is no longer defending an indigent in a case “punishable by incarceration,” but is instead representing an indigent petitioner who bears the burden of proving the claims under Rule 37.
For these reasons, I conclude that the General Assembly has not created a specific waiver of immunity for the Public Defender Commission that would enable a circuit court to order the Commission to pay attorney’s fees for appointed counsel who represent indigents in the pursuit of postconviction relief.