holding that the constitutionality of the cap is scrutinized under the deferential rational basis test and that the "legislative classification drawn ... between tort claimants whose noneconomic damages are less than [the cap] and tort claimants whose noneconomic damages are greater than [the cap], and who are thus subject to the cap, is not irrational or arbitrary"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the constitutionality of the cap is scrutinized under the deferential rational basis test and that the "legislative classification drawn ... between tort claimants whose noneconomic damages are less than [the cap] and tort claimants whose noneconomic damages are greater than [the cap], and who are thus subject to the cap, is not irrational or arbitrary"
- explaining that "the jury trial right in civil cases relates to 'issues of fact’ in legal actions [and it] does not extend to issues of law, equitable issues, or matters which historically were resolved by the judge rather than by the jury”
- holding that “the Legislature did not act arbitrarily in enacting” a $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury actions, as it possessed “several studies which concluded that $250,000 would cover most noneconomic damage claims”
- stating that § 11-108 was enacted “in response to a legislatively perceived crisis concerning the availability and cost of liability insurance in this State” caused in part by excessive noneconomic damage awards in personal injury cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McAULIFFE, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I do not agree with the majority that the interests affected by this legislation are not of sufficient importance “as to trigger any enhanced scrutiny.” Majority opinion at 361 (emphasis added). In this case particularly, where we are called upon to conduct an equal protection analysis pursuant to the provisions of the Maryland Constitution, I would utilize the flexible “continuum” or “full-spectrum” approach 1 rather than a rigid two-tier or three-tier approach. See Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, 310 Md. 406, 427-30 , 529 A.2d 1372 (1987) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
Employing that approach and subjecting the statute to a level of scrutiny consistent with the significance of the benefit curtailed, I nevertheless conclude that the General Assembly’s judgment of societal need rests upon a sufficiently firm basis to justify the limitation of benefits involved and the inequality that will sometimes inevitably result.
. The more flexible approach "allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending upon ‘the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.’ ’’ Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 , 72 L.E.2d 786 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring), quoting from San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).