The opinion
MYERS, Associate Judge
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion that the Director of Motor Vehicles did not exceed his discretionary authority in revoking petitioner’s license under Section 5(a) of Part V of the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations of the District of Columbia on the ground that petitioner is “morally unfit to operate a motor vehicle” by reason of a past criminal record, unconnected with the operation of a motor vehicle. Having tried unsuccessfully to revoke petitioner’s license for operating a motor vehicle during the commission of a felony, there having been admittedly insufficient evidence to show petitioner had used an automobile in that connection, the Director of Motor Vehicles now appears to be attempting to achieve the same objective by unduly extending the words, “not morally qualified to operate a motor vehicle,” to mean that a past criminal record alone establishes that petitioner’s manner of driving would jeopardize the safety of persons or property on the public streets.
It is not denied that petitioner has a criminal record dating back as far as 1940, but no offense involved the improper operation of a motor vehicle. I cannot agree, however, that past criminal conduct should be, without more, the basis for revocation of petitioner’s driver’s license.
The words in Section 5(a) must be read in context. That section provides that the “* * * Director of Motor Vehicles * * * is * * * authorized in his discretion to suspend or revoke the motor vehicle operator’s permit * * * of any individual who, in his opinion, is not * * * morally qualified to operate a motor *213 -vehicle in such manner as not to jeopardize the safety of persons or property * * * ” [Emphasis supplied.] As I interpret the language of this section, in order to justify revocation of a driver’s license thereunder, “moral unfitness” must have some direct relationship to the qualifications of an individual to drive a car so as not to endanger the safety of persons or property. I am of the opinion that the extension of Section 5(a) so as to render a criminal record alone •competent proof of moral unfitness to oper-rate a motor vehicle, with no definite showing that such record has actually adversely affected petitioner’s driving ability, was improper.
Under this interpretation, I find, in the facts of the present case, no connection between petitioner’s criminal record and his “moral qualifications” to drive safely in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of revocation.