Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Mpls.

RANDALL, Judge,

concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the conclusions reached by the majority, including the holding that the punitive damages, if applicable, were not improperly reduced by the trial court. But on the issue of whether public policy allows any award of punitive damages against a recognized religious organization, I dissent. The conclusion is inescapable that the strong and pronounced public policy argument exempting municipalities and labor unions from awards of punitive damages exempts recognized religious organizations as well.

This issue of punitive damages does not involve a question of appropriate compensation. The defendants agree that even on public policy grounds, punitive damages can be assessed against the individual defendants. They also agree that both the individuals and the religious entity they are associated with can be liable for compensa-ble damages. They do not agree, however, that bona fide religious organizations can be liable for punitive damages.

Plaintiff has a right to be fully and properly compensated and has been. Punitive damages, by definition, are not intended as compensation. Rather, they are intended to punish and serve as a deterrence to others. I conclude that punitive damages, as a deterrence to organizations, overstep the bounds of public policy as applied to recognized religions, on the same principles that apply to municipalities and labor unions.

In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 , 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), the Supreme Court found that while punitive damages could be recovered against an individual municipality employee, punitive damages could not be awarded against the municipality itself. The Court discussed public policy considerations and found, among other things, that if punitive damages were to be assessed against a municipality, the money would come out of the pockets of the municipal taxpayers, resulting in a downgrading of the municipal services received by residents. The Court found that taxpayers and citizens of a municipality were innocent of any wrongdoing:

[A]n award of punitive damages against a municipality “punishes” only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort. These damages are assessed over and above the amount necessary to compensate the injured party. * * * [They] are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the bill. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.

Id. 453 U.S. at 267 , 101 S.Ct. at 2759-60 (footnote omitted).

The Court also noted that assessing punitive damages against a municipality does not achieve the aim of punishing the individual who committed the act:

Under ordinary principles of retribution, it is the wrongdoer himself who is made to suffer for his unlawful conduct. If a government official acts knowingly and maliciously to deprive others of their civil rights, he may become the appropriate object of the community’s vindictive sentiments. A municipality, however, *815 can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials. Damages awarded for punitive purposes, therefore, are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself.

Id. 453 U.S. at 267 , 101 S.Ct. at 2760 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).

The United States Supreme Court did not free municipalities from responsibility for compensable damages, and did not free employees of the municipality, as individuals, from punitive damages. It simply carved out for the municipality itself the one exception defendants here seek, an exemption from an assessment of punitive damages.

Relative to labor unions, the United States Supreme Court followed the same logic. In International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 , 99 S.Ct. 2121 , 60 L.Ed.2d 698 (1979), the Supreme Court declined to allow punitive damages to be inflicted upon a union for a breach of duty to represent a member. The Court found that the award would penalize the very union members that the law mandating fair representation was intended to protect. Id. 442 U.S. at 50-51 , 99 S.Ct. at 2127 . The Court was concerned that punitive damages awards would burden the exercise of rights granted under federal labor law. Id. 442 U.S. at 51-52 , 99 S.Ct. at 2127-28 . The Supreme Court refused to burden unions “beyond the extent necessary to compensate employees for their injuries.” Id. 442 U.S. at 50 , 99 S.Ct. at 2126 . I suggest that the allowance of punitive damages against religious organizations would unduly burden the free exercise of first amendment rights established by the United States Constitution. 1

Given the priorities adopted by the federal government and by individual states, the right of citizens in a community to form a municipality, and the right of workers to organize a labor union are firmly established. I suggest that the first amendment right of the federal constitution guaranteeing to the people freedom of religion and religious organizing is equally firm. The public policy in City of Newport and Foust is sound. It should also be applied to established religion.

Both sides agree that present Minnesota law does not, with specificity, allow or disallow the assessment of punitive damages against recognized religion. It could be argued that the lack of a specific right to a punitive damages award against them by plaintiffs means that they do not have that right. It could be argued that the lack of a specific prohibition against assessing punitive damages against a religious organization means it can be done until the legislature speaks to it.

I suggest the overall intent to be gleaned from legislative enactments and prior Minnesota case law addressing the importance of taxpayers’ rights, union members’ rights, and the rights of religious organizations supports the conclusion that Minnesota public policy bars the assessment of punitive damages against an organized religion.

. The first amendment of our federal constitution provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const, amend. I.