stating that a party will “always have access to the 12 trial court for review in an original proceeding” and can argue “that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious”
How later courts described this case
- stating that a party will “always have access to the 12 trial court for review in an original proceeding” and can argue “that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious”
- noting that in administrative proceedings, contested-case procedural requirements apply when decisions directly affect specific parties’ rights
- deciding that because the proceeding involved legislative facts, we lacked jurisdiction to review the proceedings
- "Under well established canons of construction, when a legislative body enacts an amendment in the nature of a substitute to a particular statute but omits an exemption contained in the original statute, such omission is presumed to be deliberate.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KERN, Associate Judge
(concurring):
I am constrained by this court’s decision in Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n v. District of Columbia Council, D.C.App., 327 A.2d 310 (1974), to agree with the majority. There, a majority of the court (at 314) construed the statutory phrase “after a hearing” contained in the District of Columbia APA definition of “contested case” to mean “after a trial-type hearing”. In my view the “public hearing” which the Zoning Commission is required by Section 5-415 to hold before putting into effect the amendment of the zoning regulations concerning halfway houses in this case cannot be deemed a trial-type hearing. Hence we do not have a contested case before us, and in the absence of a showing of any other basis for jurisdiction in this court, I agree that the appeal must be dismissed.