rule that punitive damages must bear reasonable relationship to compensatory damage award acts as restriction on imposition of punitive damages
How later courts described this case
- rule that punitive damages must bear reasonable relationship to compensatory damage award acts as restriction on imposition of punitive damages
- “an issue raised in a post-trial motion is waived unless it is briefed or argued in post-trial proceedings”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MONTGOMERY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent, solely upon the issue of excessiveness of the $2 million punitive damage award which was upheld by the Majority in this case. This award, in my view, shocks the conscience, and should not be affirmed.
*579 Punitive damage awards may be reduced by a trial judge, or may be reduced on appeal if the reviewing court determines that they are excessive under the facts of the individual case. See Delehanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 318 Pa.Super. 90 , 464 A.2d 1243 (1983). However, I would prefer to grant a new trial in circumstances such as those presented in this case because I am convinced that due process is offended unless the issues of compensatory and punitive damages are presented to the jury in a bifurcated manner. The jury should first deliberate the issue of what compensatory damages, if any, are to be awarded to the plaintiff. Only after the verdict has been rendered on that issue should the jury be permitted to consider the question of punitive damages.
Justice O’Connor has articulated well several concerns I share regarding a denial of due process in a punitive damage procedure such as that followed in the courts of our Commonwealth, in which there are no real limits or structure. See Justice O’Connor’s recent Concurring Opinion on this issue, in Bankers Life and Casualty Company v. Crenshaw, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1645 , 100 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988). The bifurcation of the compensatory and punitive damage stages of a case, in my opinion, is one essential requirement to avoid offending due process standards. Such a bifurcated procedure is followed in other jurisdictions. See the excellent study and commentary on this point, and on punitive damage procedure generally, in Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedure, 69 Va.L.Rev. 269 (1983).
I believe that the compensatory damages which were awarded in this case were clearly affected by the presentation of evidence of the wealth of the Defendant, in connection with the jury’s consideration of the punitive damage issue at the same time. On this point, see Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383 , 485 A.2d 742 (1984). Thus, a retrial of the compensatory damage issue is warranted. This result could have been avoided by a bifurcation procedure, such as that *580 followed in other jurisdictions. I urge the adoption of such a practice in our Commonwealth.