“Since the method of taxation under the [replacement tax act] does not assign a cash value to utility property and then levy a tax on that value, it does not amount to an ad valorem mode of taxation.”
How later courts described this case
- “Since the method of taxation under the [replacement tax act] does not assign a cash value to utility property and then levy a tax on that value, it does not amount to an ad valorem mode of taxation.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting:
While I concur with Mr. Justice Clark’s dissent in respect to the double taxation of partnership income in contravention of article IX, section 3(a), of the 1970 Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, sec. 3(a)), I additionally dissent on the broader basis of the authority of this court to entertain original jurisdiction in this case.
It is well established that this court may assert original jurisdiction in cases relating to revenue only if the issues involved are purely legal in nature (73 Ill. 2d R. 381), and then only if actual facts are before us. (People ex rel. Jones v. Robinson (1951), 409 Ill. 550, 555 ; People ex rel. Ward v. Moran (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 552, 557 .) In the present case, the parties stipulate that the replacement tax will raise $520 million in revenue in 1980 as opposed to only $468 million which would have been collected under the former personal property tax had it remained in existence. It is not binding upon this court that the parties have stipulated to facts and agree that only issues of law remain. If the court finds that the determination of factual issues is necessary to relief, it will refuse to assert original jurisdiction. (Touhy v. State Board of Elections (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 303, 312 .) Clearly, the projection of the amount of revenue is, as admitted by the majority opinion, “of little or no value” due to the uncertainty of future economic events. Until the amount of revenue for 1980 can be computed with accuracy, the plaintiff’s claims involve an unsubstantiated factual issue which bars this court’s ability to assert original jurisdiction.
Furthermore, to bring an action for declaratory judgment, there must be an actual controversy. This court cannot be required “to pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events.” (Underground Contractors Association v. City of Chicago (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375 ; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Aurora (1949), 404 Ill. 331, 334 .) If an event upon which the issue is based may or may not occur, there is no controversy, and a decision regarding such hypothetical would amount to an advisory opinion. (Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 1, 11 ; Exchange National Bank v. County of Cook (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 419, 422 .) Here, because the amount of revenue to be gained under the future replacement tax is unknown, and is therein based upon pure conjecture, the action is prematurely filed and, in fact, no actual controversy exists.