holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case, who acquiesced to a general verdict form despite several theories of breach, could not then challenge the verdict on the basis that jurors may have relied on a theory not supported by sufficient evidence
How later courts described this case
- holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case, who acquiesced to a general verdict form despite several theories of breach, could not then challenge the verdict on the basis that jurors may have relied on a theory not supported by sufficient evidence
- adopting “the rule that a defendant who fails to request a special verdict form in a civil case will be barred on appeal from complaining that the jury may have relied on a factual theory unsupported by the evidence when there was sufficient evidence to support another theory properly before the jury”
- holding that defendant who objects to a request for a special verdict may not later avail him or herself of the rule of White on appeal
- describing as “general” a verdict form that “require[ed] the jury to make separate findings only on *290 negligence, proximate cause, and the award of damages for each plaintiff’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FARRELL, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join the court’s judgment and nearly all of its opinion and write separately only to point out what should be clear from our holding: that what remains of the rule of District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159 (D.C.1982), in this jurisdiction is essentially a formality. Henceforth White will apply only where the parties have urged a special verdict instruction but the trial judge, for reasons of his own, refuses to give it. 1 I have difficulty imagining that ever happening, but the prospect is so slight in any event that I think we have today repudiated White . Indeed, many of the decisions the court cites in support of the estoppel rule we adopt explicitly reject the rule of White . 2
*611 Nevertheless, I am not convinced we are acting outside our authority as a division by today’s holding, and the result we reach is the right one. A party has it within his or her means — by requesting a special verdict — to insure that a finding of negligence rests upon a theory supported by the evidence, and absent such a request there is no unfairness in assuming that juries rest their conclusions on theories founded in the evidence. I also agree that White’s demise, for all practical purposes, was forecast — hence putting prudent attorneys on notice not to oppose a special verdict in these circumstances — by our decisions beginning with District of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867 (D.C.1982), discussed by the court ante, at 608-609.
. The court hypothesizes a situation where the defendant requests a special verdict but the judge refuses it, presumably on objection by the plaintiff. Instances where the defense and not the plaintiff would request a special verdict instruction seem to me so rare as to be nonexistent.
. E.g., Reese v. Cradit, 12 Ariz.App. 233, 238 , 469 P.2d 467, 472 (1970) (accepting as "better rule" principle that general verdict will stand if evidence on one count is sufficient to sustain verdict): Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 46 Ill.2d 288, 294 , 263 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1970) (citing same rule as "settled law”); Anderson v. West, 270 S.C. 184, 187 , 241 S.E.2d 551, 553 (1978) ("we hold that where a jury returns a general verdict involving *611 two or more issues and its verdict is supported as to at least one issue, the verdict will not be reversed"); Orr v. Crowder, 173 W.Va. 335 , 315 S.E.2d 593, 607 (1983).