discussing Becknell’s, Daedler’s, and their progeny’s treatment of juvenile jury-trial rights
How later courts described this case
- discussing Becknell’s, Daedler’s, and their progeny’s treatment of juvenile jury-trial rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FIELDHOUSE, J., * Dissenting.
Although one cannot advocate the “willynilly" side-stepping of case law by selectively fancying distinctions, there occurs from time to time major distinctions which have been brought about gradually by social and legal evolution, and these occasional, contemporary situations must be rescued from seemingly controlling cases lest we become enslaved by Auto Equity. Certainly the growth and development of juvenile justice, which has been ably described by the majority, is a shining example of one such distinction.
Obviously the right to a jury is a matter of fundamental justice. Contemporary juvenile law is in no way comparable to the system addressed by the Daedler court. I do not suggest a change in the law. Rather I advocate an application of existing, tried and true legal principles to a completely new and heretofore unchallenged situation.
I agree wholeheartedly with my (step)-brothers in the majority opinion with respect to their reasoning. But I would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial where appellant was afforded his constitutional right to trial by jury.
*976 Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 21, 1984. Bird, C.J., and Reynoso, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.