stating that investigation followed by course of action which would reasonably lead claimant to conclude that formal notice is unnecessary may create estoppel
How later courts described this case
- stating that investigation followed by course of action which would reasonably lead claimant to conclude that formal notice is unnecessary may create estoppel
- affirming grant of summary judgment on estoppel where there was no representation by the defendants that could “reasonably be construed as a promise”
- refusing to toll applicable statute of limitations for anything other than statutory factors which do not include exhaustion of administrative remedies
- refusing to toll the statute of limitations for anything other than incompetence or a showing of physical and mental incapacitation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting:
I would reverse the summary judgment because a genuine issue exists with respect to whether the conduct and representations of The Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation (IPTC) constitute waiver of the right to assert non-compliance with the notice statute. For this reason I do not reach the issue concerning application of I.C. 34-4-16.5-5(a).
The trier of fact should be permitted to weigh the evidence recited by the majority here. A reasonable trier of fact, having done so might well determine that the various written communications and conversations between Coghill’s attorney and the claims adjuster for IPTC fulfilled the entire purpose of the notice requirement and further that the conduct and representations by the claims adjuster were sufficient to permit Coghill to reasonably believe that formal notice was unnecessary. Delaware County v. Powell (1979) Ind., 393 N.E.2d 190 ; City of Lubbock, Texas v. Green (5th Cir. 1953) 201 F.2d 146 ; Barber-Scotia College, Inc. v. City of New York (5 D.N.Y. *1214 1975) 390 F.Supp. 525 ; City of Montgomery v. Weldon (1967) 280 Ala. 463 , 195 So.2d 110 ; Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands (1965) Fla., 178 So.2d 9 ; Tillman v. City of Pompano Beach (1957) Fla., 100 So.2d 53 ; Anske v. Borough of Palisades Park (1976) 139 N.J.Super. 342 , 354 A.2d 87 ; LaBriola v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (1974) 227 Pa.Super. 305 , 323 A.2d 9 .
We are not here concerned with whether Coghill had knowledge of the notice requirement. Rather we are concerned with whether the conduct and representations were such as to permit a reasonable person to believe that the governmental unit was foregoing rigid compliance with that requirement and was in fact proceeding to deal with the claim itself. As heretofore expressed, I believe the trier of fact should be given an opportunity to answer that question.