holding that “[a] pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[a] pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void”
- “[a] pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled — as noted by 2 later courts
"To the extent that [In re] C.R.H., 163 Ill.2d 263, 206 Ill.Dec. 100, 644 N.E.2d 1153[(1994)], [People v.]R.S., 104 Ill.2d 1, 83 Ill.Dec. 339, 470 N.E.2d 297 [(1984)], and [People v.]R.D.S., 94 Ill.2d 77, 67 Ill.Dec. 813, 445 N.E.2d 293 [(1983)], conflict with the rule enunciated in Belleville Toyota, they are hereby expressly overruled.
2 citing opinionsin partOverruled in part by People v. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408 (2009)
To the extent that C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263, R.S., 104 Ill. 2d 1, and R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, conflict with the rule enunciated in Belle-ville Toyota, they are hereby expressly overruled.
The opinion
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, specially concurring:
I agree that because the guardian did not receive notice of the proceedings the judgment of the circuit court was properly reversed. I cannot, however, agree with that portion of the opinion which states: “A pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void.” (94 Ill. 2d at 83.) As authority for this statement the majority opinion cites People ex rel. McEntee v. Lynch (1906), 223 Ill. 346 . When McEntee was decided “An Act to regulate the treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children” provided:
“Sec. 2. The circuit and county courts of the several counties in this State, shall have original jurisdiction in all cases coming within the terms of this act. In all trials under this act any person interested therein may demand a jury of six or the judge of his own motion may order a jury of the same number to try the case.
Sec. 3. In counties having over 500,000 population, the judges of the circuit court shall at such times as they shall determine, designate one or more of their number, whose duty it shall be to hear all cases coming under this act. A special court room to be designated as the juvenile court room, shall be provided for the hearing of such cases, and the findings of the court shall be entered in a book or books to be kept for that purpose, and known as the ‘Juvenile Record,’ and the court may for convenience be called the ‘Juvenile Court.’ ” (Hurd’s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1905, ch. 23, pars. 170, 171.)
At that time section 12 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 provided that “the circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity” and that county courts had original jurisdiction in certain specified matters “and such other jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law.”
A court of general jurisdiction was presumed to have jurisdiction to render any judgment entered by it (Bartunek v. Lastovken (1932), 350 Ill. 380 ), and every reasonable presumption was indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. (Matthews v. Hoff (1885), 113 Ill. 90 .) However, no such presumption prevailed in connection with special statutory jurisdiction. In such cases jurisdiction was never presumed, and whatever the jurisdiction of the court, the proceedings were required to be in strict conformity with the statute. (Brown v. VanKeuren (1930), 340 Ill. 118 .) As said in City of Chicago v. Hitt (1929), 334 Ill. 619, 628 , “A court of general jurisdiction may have a special statutory jurisdiction conferred upon it not exercised according to the course of common law and which does not belong to it as a court of general jurisdiction. Nothing is taken by intendment in favor of the jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction, or of a court of general jurisdiction while exercising special or limited powers. In the latter case the record must show the facts which authorize the court to act, and a judgment rendered without jurisdiction may be treated as void everywhere.”
Article VI, section 9, of the Constitution of 1970 provides: “Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction ***.” In view of this broad grant of jurisdiction in our present constitution, the rationale of authorities such as McEntee is no longer applicable. The defect in this case is not that there was a failure to invoke jurisdiction; the court had jurisdiction, and there was no necessity for invoking it. The defect here was that the required statutory notice was not given and the order was therefore erroneously entered.
JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this special concurrence.