“Both cases taken together implicitly stand for the proposition that where an employer has a legitimate reason to terminate [e.g., economic necessity or a contract for employment at will], it may not do so for illegal reasons such as unlawful discrimination”
How later courts described this case
- “Both cases taken together implicitly stand for the proposition that where an employer has a legitimate reason to terminate [e.g., economic necessity or a contract for employment at will], it may not do so for illegal reasons such as unlawful discrimination”
- material issue of fact remains where plaintiff executed agreement with disclaimer language almost identical to that at issue herein
- under appropriate circumstances, oral promises may negate the effect of disclaimers which are intended to absolve employers from liability for policies presented in employee handbook
- attached as Exhibit 28 to Defendant’s motion
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Ferrett v. General Motors Corp., 438 Mich. 235 (1991)
” Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich.App. 606, 622, 302 N.W.2d 307 (Mich.Ct.App.1981), overruled on other grounds, Ferrett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 438 Mich. 235, 239-40, 475 N.W.2d 243 (1991).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Fournier v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 82 Md. App. 31 (1990)
102 Mich.App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981), which is relied on by appellant, is distinguishable.
Distinguished by Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (1986)
Schipani is readily distinguishable.
Distinguished by Raymond R. Wiskotoni v. Michigan National Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (1983)
The Schipani court held that even though the case was factually distinguishable from Toussaint, the trial judge acted properly in presenting the case to the jury because factual issues existed as to whether the oral promises or written statements in the employer’s policy manuals made the employment contract not terminable at will.
The opinion
Beasley, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the within case is distinguishable from Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan 1 because of the presence of the following provision in plaintiffs written employment agreement with defendant: "I understand that my employment is not for any definite term and may be terminated at any time, without advance notice by either myself or Ford Motor Company”.
Thus, I would believe that Toussaint does not require the result reached by the majority. Under Lynas v Maxwell Farms, 2 I believe summary judgment should have been granted and, accordingly, would reverse the trial court in that respect.
Regarding Counts I through V, I concur with the majority._
408 Mich 579 ; 292 NW2d 880 (1980).
279 Mich 684 ; 273 NW 315 (1937).