concluding that there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant committed the crime in a brutal or heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty where the defendant stabbed the victim 24 times in the head, neck, and body, used an eight-inch kitchen knife, ripped out clumps of the victim's hair with portions of her scalp still attached, and used such force in stabbing the victim that the knife blade was bent at a 90-degree angle
How later courts described this case
- concluding that there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant committed the crime in a brutal or heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty where the defendant stabbed the victim 24 times in the head, neck, and body, used an eight-inch kitchen knife, ripped out clumps of the victim's hair with portions of her scalp still attached, and used such force in stabbing the victim that the knife blade was bent at a 90-degree angle
- holding that for the State to properly obtain multiple convictions for connected acts that might be treated as a series of offenses, the State must appor- - 12 - tion the acts to the offenses in the charging instrument
- emphasizing that each stab wound made by defendant could have supported multiple convictions, but the indictment showed that the State intended to treat defendant’s conduct as a single attack because the State did not apportion the crimes among the stab wounds
- holding that in such cases "the indictment must indicate that the State intended to treat the conduct of defendant as multiple acts in order for multiple convictions to be sustained"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Stanford, 352 Ill. Dec. 311 (2011)
Accordingly, Crespo is inapposite.
The opinion
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), was rendered a dead letter in this state by a majority of this court in People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003). In that case, the majority wrongly held that Apprendi violations are subject to harmless error analysis. See Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d at 378 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). By so holding, the majority essentially renders unassailable most illegally imposed extended-term sentences where a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of an aggravating factor in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2002) (finding that defendant’s crime was brutal and heinous unconstitutionally made by a trial judge).
Curiously, the majority in this case has not relied on Thurow in addressing the Apprendi violation that occurred below, despite harmless error being the only argument urged by the State. Instead, the majority, sua sponte, raises and decides this case on an issue neither briefed nor argued by the parties: plain error. Perhaps the majority is hesitant to apply Thurow because doing so is essentially the same as affirming a directed verdict for the State. See Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d at 377-78 (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
An equally troubling concern presented by this case is its remarkable similarity to People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378 (2002), decided a mere four months ago. Swift is precisely on point and requires vacatur of defendant’s sentence. In Swift, as here, the defendant failed to argue an Apprendi error before the trial court. The Apprendi violation that occurred in Swift was the very same that occurred here: a “brutal and heinous” finding made by a trial judge by a preponderance of the evidence. The Swift appellate court recognized the error, even though the defendant failed to raise the issue before the circuit court, called the error one that “affect[ed] a fundamental right,” and vacated the defendant’s extended sentence, remanding for a new sentencing hearing. People v. Swift, 322 Ill. App. 3d 127, 128-31 (2001). This court affirmed. We unambiguously held that “for purposes of Apprendi analysis, the ‘sentencing range’ for first degree murder in Illinois is 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment.” Swift, 202 Ill. 2d at 392 . Any higher sentence based on additional factual findings “must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Swift, 202 Ill. 2d at 392 .
Defendant in this case received a 75-year sentence, 15 years above the prescribed maximum, based on the trial judge’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was brutal and heinous. The evidence showed the victim had been stabbed 24 times. The defendant in Swift received an 80-year sentence, 20 years above the prescribed maximum, also based on a trial judge’s brutal and heinous finding. The victim in Swift had been stabbed 21 times. Neither defendant raised an Apprendi argument before the circuit court. Yet, the defendant’s sentence in Swift was vacated by this court in light of Apprendi, while defendant’s sentence in the controversy at hand is allowed to stand in spite of Apprendi. For some reason, the majority is now willing to speculate as to what the jury might have found based on the evidence adduced at defendant’s trial, when this court was unequivocally unwilling to do so for an almost identically situated defendant in Swift. We were right in Swift. The majority is wrong here. Nothing justifies these diametrically opposed holdings. Apprendi errors are now, in the view of the majority, either harmless or not “plain.” As a result, defendants who have had their constitutional rights nullified by such errors will now look in vain to the sixth amendment for protection. The majority’s opinion in the instant case, as in Thurow, marks a significant abrogation of our basic civil liberties and I, therefore, respectfully dissent.