holding that under Illinois law, resignation after resign-or-be-fired ultimatum is involuntary termination
How later courts described this case
- holding that under Illinois law, resignation after resign-or-be-fired ultimatum is involuntary termination
- contract includes employee manual issued by board of trustees when the contract states that it is subject to the by-laws, policies, rules, and regulations of the board
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting:
I would affirm the order of the trial court for the reason that the amended complaint alleged only conclusions of the pleader upon the issue of duress in procuring the resignation of the plaintiff. The allegations here pleaded are no more allegations of fact than those found in People ex rel. Marcoline v. Ragen (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 523 , 270 N.E.2d 643 , or Whitaker v. Pierce (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 148 , 358 N.E.2d 61 . In the latter case the court stated:
“When one voluntarily submits a resignation, he thereby divests himself of any legal interest in his former employment. (Cf. Bauer.) It is conceivable that one could present sufficient facts to indicate that a resignation was involuntarily coerced and thus was legally equivalent to a discharge. (See, e.g., Moreno v. Cairns (1942), 20 Cal. 2d 531 , 127 P.2d 914 .) However, plaintiff does not do so here. He merely alleges that his resignation was demanded by Hillborn and that he was ‘acting under the coercion and wrongful influence’ of Hillborn when he submitted it. In the light of the indicated voluntariness of his letter of resignation2 which was before the trial court, and because the aforesaid allegations are conclusory, we think that a showing of ultimate probable success was not made.” 44 Ill. App. 3d 148, 151 , 358 N.E.2d 61, 64 .
The opinion in Ragen discloses allegations of fact substantially more specific than those pleaded here. The opinion states, nevertheless:
“The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s amended complaint, on the ground that the allegations of duress and coercion were conclusions only, and that the complaint was insufficient since it did not allege facts from which it would have been inferred that the resignation was the product of duress perpetrated by defendants. * * * We agree that the allegations of duress in plaintiff’s amended complaint are mere conclusions and do not disclose facts to support a finding that his resignation was the product of duress and coercion.” 132 Ill. App. 2d 523, 525 , 270 N.E.2d 643, 644 .