The opinion
HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
IC 1971, 22-3-7-9(f) (formerly (e)) (1980 Burns Supp.) clearly states:
“(f) No compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational diseases unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e) of this section, occurs within two [2] years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease except in cases of occupational diseases caused by the inhalation of silica dust, coal dust, or asbestos dust and in such cases, within three [3] years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of such disease. However, in all cases of occupational disease caused by the exposure to radiation, no compensation shall be payable unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e) of this section, occurs within [2] years from the date on which the employee had knowledge of the nature of his occupational disease or, by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of such disease and its causal relationship to his employment.” (Emphasis added.)
The law in Indiana is well settled that statutes of limitation are determinations *426 which are within the province of the Legislature. The court cannot overrule that decision made by the Legislature unless the period of time allowed is unreasonable. Short v. Texaco, Inc. (1980), Ind., 406 N.E.2d 625 . See also, Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, et al. (1956), 235 Ind. 307 , 133 N.E.2d 713 .
The statute of limitation in question is not unreasonable in that it in effect does not deny the right of recovery which the Legislature sought to confer. Wright-Bachman, supra. The Legislature was aware of the problems caused by asbestos as evidenced by the inclusion of a specific provision regarding asbestos in the statute it enacted. 1 With this in mind, it added an additional year to the time period for limitation of actions for a certain category of occupational diseases including those caused by inhalation of asbestos dust.
The general purpose of a statute of limitations is to encourage prompt resolution of claims. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. (1980), Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585 . Bunker was last exposed to asbestos fibers in November of 1950. Yet his claim was not brought until June of 1978. Clearly in enacting a provision for a 3-year limitation it cannot be seriously argued that the Legislature really meant to cover a period of 28 years.
A statute is presumed to be constitutional and is entitled to every reasonable presumption supporting its validity. Johnson, supra. Bunker has not overcome the heavy burden necessary to prove this statute unconstitutional.
IC 1971, 22-3-7-9(f) clearly states the wishes of the Legislature. It is neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional. Therefore, this Court and the Industrial Board have no choice but to defer to those wishes expressed by the Legislature. Any change in the statute is for the Legislature to make.
The decision of the Industrial Board should be affirmed.
. As the majority points out on page 5 of their opinion, asbestosis has been medically recognized for more than 50 years.