concluding that defendant failed to establish that he was forced to take an objectionable juror as a result of trial court=s denial of application for writs of attachment requiring appearance of prospective jurors, and thus denial of application did not constitute reversible error; and defendant did not at trial, or on appeal, point to any evidence to support his allegations that prospective jurors were challengeable for cause
How later courts described this case
- concluding that defendant failed to establish that he was forced to take an objectionable juror as a result of trial court=s denial of application for writs of attachment requiring appearance of prospective jurors, and thus denial of application did not constitute reversible error; and defendant did not at trial, or on appeal, point to any evidence to support his allegations that prospective jurors were challengeable for cause
- holding second, warned statement that repeated first unwarned statement inadmissible because waiver of rights given in connection with second statement was not constitutionally valid in light of circumstances and entire course of police conduct, but finding error in admission harmless beyond reasonable doubt
- holding that, to demonstrate injury resulting from trial court’s failure to grant attachment, defendant must demonstrate that he was forced to accept “objectionable juror,” or juror “against whom such cause for challenge exists as would likely affect [the juror’s] competency or his impartiality in the trial”
- holding that “the mere passage of time does not, by itself, automatically obviate prior Miranda warnings,” but the totality of the circumstances will determine whether additional warnings were required
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOMACK, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in which JOHNSON, J., joined.
With all respect to the Members of the Court who have decided otherwise, I would not conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the constitutional violation in admitting the appellant’s confessions to two additional murders at the punishment stage of this capital trial did not contribute to the jury’s verdict for capital punishment. I would sustain the appellant’s first point, *804 affirm the judgment of guilt, and remand this case for a new punishment hearing.