holding that a chem ical waste disposal site constituted a nuisance because it was “highly probable” that, “through migration” or other events, “highly toxic chemical wastes deposited at the site [could] escape and contaminate the air, water, or ground around the site”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a chem ical waste disposal site constituted a nuisance because it was “highly probable” that, “through migration” or other events, “highly toxic chemical wastes deposited at the site [could] escape and contaminate the air, water, or ground around the site”
- dealing with a chemical waste landfill that substantially threatened "the air, water, or ground around the site.”
- a “ ‘ “public nuisance is the doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public” ’ ”
- affirming mandatory injunction requiring operator of chemical waste disposal site to remove all toxic waste
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE RYAN, concurring:
While I agree with both the result reached by the majority and the reasoning employed supporting the opinion, I wish to add a brief comment. In response to the defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to apply the proper standard for determining when a prospective nuisance may be enjoined, the majority concluded that the court had in fact applied the correct rule as set out in Fink v. Board of Trustees (1966), 71 Ill. App. 2d 276 . I am concerned that the holding of Fink, quoted by the majority (86 Ill. 2d at 26), may be an unnecessarily narrow view of the test for enjoining prospective tortious conduct in general. Any injunction is, by its very nature, the product of a court’s balancing of competing interests, with a result equitably obtained. Prosser, in discussing the law of nuisance, quoted by the majority (86 Ill. 2d at 26), states:
“ [I] f the possibility [of harm] is merely uncertain or contingent [the plaintiff] may be left to his remedy after the nuisance has occurred.” Prosser, Torts sec. 90, at 603 (4th ed. 1971).
Prosser thus recognizes that there are cases in which the possibility of inflicting harm is slight and where the plaintiff may be left to his remedy at law. However, I believe that there are situations where the harm that is potential is so devastating that equity should afford relief even though the possibility of the harmful result occurring is uncertain or contingent. The Restatement’s position applicable to preventative injunctive relief in general is that “ [t] he more serious the impending harm, the less justification there is for taking the chances that are involved in pronouncing the harm too remote.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 933, at 561, comment b (1979).) If the harm that may result is severe, a lesser possibility of it occurring should be required to support injunctive relief. Conversely, if the potential harm is less severe, a greater possibility that it will happen should be required. Also, in the balancing of competing interests, a court may find a situation where the potential harm is such that a plaintiff will be left to his remedy at law if the possibility of it occurring is slight. This balancing test allows the court to consider a wider range of factors and avoids the anomalous result possible under a more restrictive alternative where a person engaged in an ultrahazardous activity with potentially catastrophic results would be allowed to continue until he has driven an entire community to the brink of certain disaster. A court of equity need not wait so long to provide relief.
Although the “dangerous probability” test has certainly been met in this case, I would be willing to enjoin the activity on a showing of probability of occurrence substantially less than that which the facts presented to this court reveal, due to the extremely hazardous nature of the chemicals being dumped and the potentially catastrophic results.