in dictum, noting the “risk that counsel may attempt to use the device of raising his own ineffectiveness on direct appeal as a vehicle to circumvent the [Supreme] Court’s holding in Clair [Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974)]”
How later courts described this case
- in dictum, noting the “risk that counsel may attempt to use the device of raising his own ineffectiveness on direct appeal as a vehicle to circumvent the [Supreme] Court’s holding in Clair [Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974)]”
- extension hearing held 16 days subsequent to expiration of run date permissible under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
In my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Lewis, 247 Pa.Super. 46 , 371 A.2d 1318 (1977), I expressed my opinion that the holding of Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214 , 364 A.2d 1345 (1976), should be applied to cases decided prior to the announcement of the decision. That is, when we are called upon to review the grant of an extension of time under Rule 1100(c) on account of judicial delay, we must apply the Mayfield standard that “ . . . the record must also show the causes of the court delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided.” Id. 469 Pa. at 222 , 364 A.2d at 1350 . In my view if there is no such record showing then the record must be remanded.
*117 In this case I would not remand since the lower court’s opinion, while written without the benefit of the Court’s opinion in Mayfield , shows a sufficient explanation for the delay and the reasons it could not be avoided.