The opinion
Moore, J.
I dissent. I disagree with the holding in Division III of the majority opinion.
Since Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911 , 243 N.W. 552 , we have consistently held a violation of a law of the road established by statute or ordinance is negligence per se in the absence of a showing of legal excuse. The only exception to the rule is in *545 driving on the wrong side of the road where an accident occurs outside of cities and towns (Code section 321.298).
We have applied this rule to violation of Code section 321.297 (formerly Code section 5019.) which provides:
“Traveling on right-hand side. The operator of a motor vehicle, in cities and towns, shall at all times travel on the right-hand side of the center of the street.”
In Winter v. Davis, 217 Iowa 424 , 251 N.W. 770 , plaintiff had stopped his vehicle on his right-hand side of the street in Mason City and was getting out when defendant coming from the- opposite direction drove to his left across the center of the street and into plaintiff’s stopped vehicle. We held violation of Code section 5019 (now section 321.297) negligence per se as defendant offered no legal excuse.
Silvia v. Pennock, 253 Iowa 779 , 113 N.W.2d 749 , involves a collision of two vehicles traveling in opposite directions on a Des Moines street. In discussing- the rule established by Kisliug and the only exception (violation of Code section 321.298) at page 787 of 253 Iowa, page 754 of 113 N.W.2d, we said:.
“As explained in Division III hereof, violation of 321.298 is merely prima-facie evidence of negligence, not negligence per se or as a matter of law, as is violation of 321.297. * * * However, violation of 321.297 may be justified only by evidence of a legal excuse therefor.”
In McMaster v. Hutchins, 255 Iowa 39 , 120 N.W.2d 509 , we compare section 321.297 with section 321.298 which provides:
“Meeting and turning to right. Persons on horseback, or in vehicles, including motor vehicles, meeting each other on the public highway, shall give one-half of the traveled way thereof by turning to the right.”
In the McMaster case at page 47 of 255 Iowa, page 513 of 120 N.W.2d, we state:
“Violation of this statute [section 321.298] is only prima facie evidence of negligence, not negligence per se or as a matter of law, as is violation of other statutory rules of the road, including 321.297 requiring motorists in cities and towns to travel at all times on the right of the center of the street. NoncOmpliance with 321.298 may be justified by evidence the motorist was *546 in the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances, notwithstanding such noncompliance. However, violation of other statutory rules of the road may be justified only by showing one of the four recognized legal excuses therefor. Worthington v. McDonald, 246 Iowa 466, 473, 474 , 68 N.W.2d 89, 93, 94 , 47 A. L. R.2d 135, 140, 141, and citations; Silvia v. Pennock, 253 Iowa 779 , 113 N.W.2d 749, 752, 754 .”
See also Iowa State Bar Association Uniform Instruction No. 4.8.
Thus it must be observed we have given section 321.297 the meaning expressed by its clear and unambiguous provisions.
The majority opinion without overruling the cited eases is apparently holding that section 321.297 means what it says if plaintiff’s vehicle (parked or not) is struck head on by defendant’s vehicle but not if plaintiff is struck from the rear.
The holding of the majority puts the meaning of section
321.297 into a complete state of confusion. What are the rights and duties of drivers attempting to enter a city' street from a private driveway? In Riddle v. Frankl, 215 Iowa 1083 , 247 N.W. 493 , we considered a pedestrian’s right to assume a vehicle would not be driven to extreme left-hand side of a city street. What happens to the right to assume under the holding of the majority?
No citation of authority is needed for the proposition that we have no right to ignore and change a clear and unambiguous statutory rule of the road just because we dislike folio-wing slow-moving traffic in cities and towns. As to section 321.297, I believe the majority opinion does just that.
I would continue to follow the cited cases and give section
321.297 its clear meaning, reserving to a violator the right to show legal excuse.
Snell, J., joins in this dissent.