Opinion

Commonwealth v. Fiore

  • 445 Pa. Super. 401
  • 665 A.2d 1185
  • 1995 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2985
Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 20, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Hoffman
On the bench
Rowley, Kelly, Hoffman
Cited by
27 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.6%

Reversed on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 557 Pa. 453 (1999)

allowing a post-conviction petitioner to petition for a writ of coram nobis without satisfying the eligibility requirements of the PCRA, improperly creates a second means of obtaining collateral relief, which contravenes the legislative intent that the PCRA be the sole means of obtaining such relief

How later courts described this case

  • allowing a post-conviction petitioner to petition for a writ of coram nobis without satisfying the eligibility requirements of the PCRA, improperly creates a second means of obtaining collateral relief, which contravenes the legislative intent that the PCRA be the sole means of obtaining such relief
  • stating that petitioners may not use the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis as a way to circumvent the PCRA’s requirements
  • “[T]he writ of error coram nobis is a procedural tool whose purpose is to correct errors of fact only.” (emphasis added; citation, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted)
  • discussing limited nature of that writ

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

HOFFMAN, Judge,

concurring:

As appellant’s direct appeal was final when the Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273 , 634 A.2d 1109 (1993), and as his claim had already been previously litigated, I agree with my distinguished colleagues that appellant is not eligible for relief under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3); Pa.C.S. § 9544; Commonwealth v. DeHart, 539 Pa. 5 , 650 A.2d 38 (1994) (issues previously litigated may not be relitigated in PCRA action); Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 512 Pa. 349, 355 , 516 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1986) (new rule of law will not be applied retroactively after appellant’s direct appeal is final).

However, I write separately to emphasize that there are circumstances where a departure from the PCRA’s stringent eligibility requirements is appropriate, such as where there are extraordinary circumstances or a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 534 Pa. 483 , 633 A.2d 1098 (1993) (where a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice occurred, a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief will be entertained); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 390 Pa.Super. 464 , 568 A.2d 1266 (1989) (extraordinary circumstances may overcome petitioner’s *419 failure to raise issue below), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 663 , 583 A.2d 792 (1990).

In the instant case, the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated that appellant deliberately altered the groundwater monitoring system, wrongfully discharged hazardous waste into an unnamed tributary of the Youghiogheny River, and lied under oath to the Commonwealth Court. Although appellant is serving a sentence for a conviction based upon evidence which would no longer support a conviction in Pennsylvania, I believe appellant’s conviction was not a miscarriage of justice or an extraordinary circumstance warranting a departure from the provisions of the PCRA.

Accordingly, I concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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