stating that, although the defendant waived his claim that the trial court improperly refused to consider certain mitigating evidence at the defendant’s death penalty hearing, we would review the claim for error, as it concerned the fundamental fairness of that proceeding
How later courts described this case
- stating that, although the defendant waived his claim that the trial court improperly refused to consider certain mitigating evidence at the defendant’s death penalty hearing, we would review the claim for error, as it concerned the fundamental fairness of that proceeding
- holding that the State did not meet its burden of showing that the sentencing judge’s refusal to consider all mitigating evidence regarding good jail behavior was harmless
- explaining that an improper denial of cross-examination may be harmless for various reasons, including when the excluded testimony was cumulative with other evidence
- "Because the basis for defendant's claim is the circuit judge's alleged refusal to consider certain mitigating evidence at defendant's death penalty hearing, which concerns the fundamental fairness of that proceeding, we review the claim for error."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
The majority holds that the death sentence imposed in this case must be reversed because the sentencing judge violated the United States Constitution by refusing to consider evidence of defendant’s good behavior during pretrial incarceration. Because this holding is both legally and factually flawed, I respectfully dissent.
The majority claims that reversal of defendant’s death sentence is compelled by Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 , 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982). In Eddings, however, the sentencing judge mistakenly believed that, as a matter of law, he was not allowed to consider a particular mitigating circumstance (in that case, the defendant’s difficult and violent childhood). Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113 , 71 L. Ed. 2d at 10 , 102 S. Ct. at 876 . The Supreme Court held that because the defendant was entitled to have the evidence in question considered by the sentencer, the judge’s ruling that the evidence was improper necessitated resentencing. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-17 , 71 L. Ed. 2d at 10-12 , 102 S. Ct. at 876-78 . Eddings thus requires reversal of a death sentence only when the trial court applies an erroneous legal standard in determining whether the sentencer may consider certain mitigating evidence. The other cases cited by the majority stand simply for the proposition that the sentencer in a capital case must be allowed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, as a close examination of the facts of those cases will reveal. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 , 95 L. Ed. 2d 347 , 107 S. Ct. 1821 (1987) (reversing death sentence where trial court erroneously precluded sentencer from considering certain mitigating circumstances); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 , 90 L. Ed. 2d 1 , 106 S. Ct. 1669 (1986) (holding that trial court erred in precluding defendant from introducing at capital sentencing hearing evidence of his good behavior during pretrial incarceration); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 , 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978) (plurality opinion) (invalidating state death penalty statute which precluded sentencer from considering all relevant mitigating circumstances).
In this case, the sentencing judge heard all relevant mitigating evidence, and was under no mistaken impressions of what evidence he could consider. Having heard all of this evidence, the judge concluded that defendant’s good behavior while incarcerated did not justify imposition of a sentence other than death. The majority asserts that the judge refused to consider evidence of defendant’s behavior while incarcerated. That is incorrect. The judge’s specific references to and discussion of this evidence demonstrate that he did consider it. Having considered it, however, he determined that it was not a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the death penalty. Reversal of defendant’s death sentence thus is not compelled by Eddings or by any other Supreme Court case interpreting the United States Constitution.
For these reasons, I would affirm the death sentence imposed by the circuit court.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN and JUSTICE MILLER join in this dissent.