noting that “untold numbers of plaintiff and defense attorneys were surprised by what they perceived as a dramatic change in the law” and that “most members of the bench, including myself, were also surprised to discover that MCL 600.5852 did not contain any periods of limitations, so the general tolling statute ‘plainly’ did not apply to it”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “untold numbers of plaintiff and defense attorneys were surprised by what they perceived as a dramatic change in the law” and that “most members of the bench, including myself, were also surprised to discover that MCL 600.5852 did not contain any periods of limitations, so the general tolling statute ‘plainly’ did not apply to it”
- arguing that, before Waltz was decided, “[f]ew lawyers, if any, could have predicted that [MCL 600.5856] presumably applied to the discovery rule’s ‘statute of limitations,’ but never applies to the comparable limitations in [MCL 600.5852]. Reasonable attorneys unsurprisingly concluded that [MCL 600.5856] applied to both”
- “If everyone was free to disobey lawful court orders until the orders were ratified by some other tribunal, the result would be anarchy and disorder.”
- noting that Waltz was confusing and set up a trap for prospective plaintiffs
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*745 WILDER, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. I also join in parts I and 11(A) of Judge O’Connell’s concurring opinion, for the reason that I agree with Judge O’Connell’s view that a plenary discussion by the Supreme Court concerning the propriety of prospective application of Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 ; 677 NW2d 813 (2004), would be of great benefit to the bench and bar.