Opinion

State v. McBride

  • 296 N.W.2d 551
  • 1980 S.D. LEXIS 390
Court
South Dakota Supreme Court
Filed
Sep 17, 1980
Status
Published
Author
Fosheim
On the bench
Henderson, Dunn, Morgan, Fosheim, Wollman
Cited by
50 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.6%

noting that the accomplice was “the only individual to give testimony which linked appellant with the burglary,” and “the [S]tate did not have a case without the testimony of an accomplice or a colleague in crime”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that the accomplice was “the only individual to give testimony which linked appellant with the burglary,” and “the [S]tate did not have a case without the testimony of an accomplice or a colleague in crime”
  • “No advantage could have been envisioned by -10- #30145 appellant’s counsel in withholding requests for these instructions.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOSHEIM, Justice

(concurring specially).

While I agree in substance with the majority opinion, my views differ on the nature of Williams’ testimony. In this case, Williams should have been deemed an accomplice as a matter of law. As stated in Lasley v. State, 287 P. 1055, 1056 (Okl.Cr.1930): “The test by which to determine whether a witness is an accomplice is to ascertain whether he could be indicted for the offense for which the accused is being tried.” See also Wood v. State, 341 P.2d 613 (Okl.Cr.1959). In Lasley , the witness was deemed not to be an accomplice where he did not participate in the larceny either by being present at the time of its commission or, if absent, by counseling and advising or encouraging the active participants; he had taken no part at all in the original taking or asportation. In the present case, Williams was in close association with appellant both before and after the alleged burglary and waited in the stalled automobile during the purported commission of the crime; by his own admission, he helped transport the fruits of the crime. He thus could have been indicted as a principal for the offense allegedly committed by appellant. Cf . State v. Brown, 285 N.W.2d 848 (S.D.1979); State v. Moellar, 281 N.W.2d 271 (S.D.1979). This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the evidence might have been insufficient to convict Williams as a principal or by the fact that he was only charged with receiving stolen property.

The rule that an accused cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is so well-settled that citation of authority is hardly required. One clear purpose of the rule is to minimize the possibility of convictions based upon the potentially unreliable testimony of persons induced to testify by promises of leniency. Williams was granted immunity, and his testimony was the only evidence linking appellant with the crime. Thus, the test set forth in Lasley, supra, is appropriate here, particularly where the witness, Williams, was apparently granted complete transactional immunity in return for his testimony against appellant.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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