noting that intermediate scrutiny applies “when an act involves a semi-suspect class”
How later courts described this case
- noting that intermediate scrutiny applies “when an act involves a semi-suspect class”
- finding that the Legislature intended two distinct standards for forfeiture of office when it used different language in two subsections of the Act
- "It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that full effect should be given, if possible, to every word of a statute. We cannot assume that the Legislature used meaningless language." (quoting Gabin v. Skyline Cabana Club, 54 N.J. 550, 555, 258 A.2d 6 (1969) )
- noting that intermediate scrutiny applies “when an act involves a semi-suspect *261 class”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COLEMAN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the Court’s determination in Point III of its opinion that petitioner Gerald McCann is barred by the Faulkner Act, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-166, from becoming a candidate for the office of Mayor of the City of Jersey City. I disagree with the Court’s conclusion in Point II that the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice’s disqualification provision, N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2d, does not similarly bar him from running for the office of Mayor. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division barring his candidacy under both statutory schemes substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Petrella in his well-reasoned opinion.