The opinion
FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
Under the circumstances of this case, Nannie G. Hoffmann (Claimant) had the burden of proving that her work-related injury occurred while in the course of her employment. Because I believe that Claimant has satisfied this burden, I respectfully dissent.
As indicated by the majority, an employee not engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer must satisfy three conditions under the Workers’ Compensation Act 1 (Act) in order for the injury to have occurred in the course of employment. The Act requires that (1) the injury occurred on the employer’s premises, (2) the employee’s presence thereon was required by the nature of the employment and (3) the injury was caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business thereon. Dana Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 120 Pa.Cmwlth. 277 , 548 A.2d 669 (1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 606 , 562 A.2d 828 (1989). The majority concludes that Claimant failed to satisfy the second of these conditions, reasoning that because Employer did not mandate that Claimant pick up her paycheck on Employer’s premises, Claimant was not required by the nature of her employment to be on the premises, and thus, Claimant was not within the course of her employment at the time of her injury. I cannot agree.
In seeking the payment of due wages, an employee may be acting in the course of employment. Dandy v. Glaze, 197 Pa.Super. 218 , 177 A.2d 157 (1962); Griffin v. Acme Coal Co., 161 Pa.Super. 28 , 54 A.2d 69 (1947). Therefore, an injury sustained by an employee while the employee is collecting wages may be compensable under the Act. Dandy . Unlike the majority, I believe that Claimant’s injury is compensable because, when Claimant picked up her paycheck, she was acting in accordance with an accepted practice of Employer for the payment of its employees. Employer gives its employees three options for receiving their paychecks; they may (1) pick up their paychecks in person; (2) use direct deposit; or (3) supply a self-addressed stamped envelope to Employer so that Employer can mail the paycheck to the employee. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, No. 9.) Although Employer encouraged its employees to have their paychecks directly deposited into their bank accounts, Employer’s employee handbook states that employees “may receive [their] check personally.” (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, No. 9; R.R. at 161A.)
The majority concludes that, because Employer did not require Claimant to pick up her paycheck in person, Claimant’s injury is not compensable. Although personal pickup was not required, I believe that by personally picking up her paycheck, Claimant was acting in accordance with the first option established by Employer as an acceptable method of receiving payment and that this was sufficient to place her in the course of her employment at the time of her injury. See St. Anthony Hosp. v. James, 889 P.2d 1279 (Okl.App.1994). In concluding otherwise, the majority relies on Griffin and Dandy . I disagree that these cases compel the denial of benefits here.
The majority interprets Griffin as “implying” that whenever an employer provides its employees with alternate methods of pay distribution that do not require the employee’s presence at employer’s premises, any injury suffered by an employee while picking up his or her wages on employer’s premises would not be compensable under the Act. I believe that the majority has erred in reading this “implication” into the language of Griffin . I believe that Griffin is more appropriately read as indicating that a claimant who sustains an injury when picking up his or her paycheck at an employer’s premises is entitled to benefits where the “[claimant was acting in accordance with [a] practice which [the employer] had established, and, conse *572 quently, at the time he was in the course of his employment.” Griffin, 54 A.2d at 70 . Like the claimant in Griffin , Claimant here was acting in accordance with a practice established by Employer when Claimant picked up her paycheck at Employer’s premises and, consequently, I would conclude that Claimant was in the course of her employment.
Indeed, I cannot understand why the majority believes that Dandy supports its interpretation of Griffin when, in Dandy , the court recognized Griffin as standing for my aforementioned proposition. As stated by the majority, Dandy recognizes Griffin as meaning “that an employee seeking remuneration of wages due would be acting in furtherance of his employment and that therefore, an accident which occurred while the employee was seeking his wages in accordance with the employer’s practices would be compensable under the Act.” (Majority op. at 569.)
We must be ever mindful that the Act is remedial in nature and its purpose is to benefit the workers of this Commonwealth. Harper & Collins v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 543 Pa. 484 , 672 A.2d 1319 (1996). As such, the Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its humanitarian objectives. Id. Moreover, borderline interpretations of the Act are to be construed in the injured party’s favor. Id.; Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 479 Pa. 618 , 389 A.2d 42 (1978).
Because being paid is a major benchmark of the employer-employee relationship, because Claimant received her paycheck in accordance with an acceptable method established by Employer and because we are required to liberally construe the Act to the benefit of injured workers, I would conclude that Claimant satisfied her burden of proving that she was injured while in the course of her employment. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S.§§ 1-1041.4.