The opinion
JOHNSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion limits the scope of our review of the court order denying appellant’s application to the traditional “abuse of discretion” standard. It quotes several Court of Appeal opinions suggesting this is the rule. The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, has stressed many times that denials of relief from the claims filing requirement are subject to a different and higher standard of review on appeal. Indeed, in our consideration of a trial court’s denial of the relief provided by section 946.6, I am convinced we are not only guided but bound by the Supreme Court’s repeated expressions the statute is to be liberally applied and particularly close appellate scrutiny should be given a denial of such relief.
The governing rules were restated recently in Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 673 P.2d 271 ], as follows: “Section 946.6 is a remedial statute intended to provide relief from technical rules which otherwise provide a trap for the unwary claimant. [Citation omitted.] The remedial policies underlying the statute are ‘that wherever possible cases be heard on their merits, and any doubts which may exist should be resolved infavor of the application. ’ [Citation omitted.] Thus, ‘ [a]n appellate *1378 court will be more rigorous in examining the denial of such relief than its allowance.’ [Citation omitted.]” (Italics added.) (Accord County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545, 552 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 158 , 483 P.2d 774 ]; Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 28-29, 31 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 666 , 423 P.2d 818 ].)
Resolving all doubts in favor of the application is a far cry from resolving all doubts in favor of the trial court’s decision to deny the application which is the standard the majority applies. Instead we must ask ourselves—did the trial court in exercising its discretion resolve all doubts in favor of appellant’s application? Pretty clearly, it did not and thus the decision should be reversed.
In this case, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated the city had told Mrs. Cole orally she had a full year to file her claim. The uncontroverted evidence also demonstrated the written notice she received announcing she actually only had 100 days was concealed under a card stapled to the letter sent to her. True, she also said she did not file the claim immediately because of her physical condition. However, a court exercising its discretion to “resolve all doubts in favor of the application” would have construed the latter statement as merely an explanation of why Mrs. Cole waited later into the one-year period she had been led to believe she had available for filing a claim instead of filing it immediately after she received the letter from the city. Ordinarily one would expect a 73-year-old person to initiate legal action just as soon as possible even if she were allowed one year—or ten years—to file her claim. And presumably if Mrs. Cole had taken steps to file her claim with the city shortly after she received the letter she probably would have removed the card and found the notice of the 100-day time limit concealed beneath. It is entirely logical to construe this part of Mrs. Cole’s statement as merely pointing out her physical condition was enough to overcome the sense of urgency about filing a claim one would ordinarily anticipate in an elderly person and thus to explain why she did not discover the city had erred in advising her she had a full year to file.
The trial court appears to have resolved all doubts against not in favor of the application. In the majority’s view, the trial judge interpreted Mrs. Cole’s mention of her physical condition to mean Mrs. Cole had not been misled about when she was required to file the claim. Rather she was only contending her condition was so bad it excused her deliberate disregard of the time limit she knew applied to her claim. I am not sure this is even a reasonable inference from the uncontroverted facts. I am especially doubtful given the additional factor that Mrs. Cole lodged her application immediately after being made aware she had only 100 days rather than a year to file with the city. But even if this were a logically permissible inference it is by no *1379 means the only logically permissible inference one could have drawn from the several facts established by the evidence before the court. Indeed an inference which is at least as probable as the one the trial court chose to draw was discussed in the previous paragraph. That inference would have required the trial court to grant Mrs. Cole’s application. Thus, the trial court chose an inference which defeats an application for relief over an equally logical one which supports the application. This means the trial court abused its discretion by failing to “resolve any doubts in favor of the application” as instructed by the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, I feel this court is compelled to reverse the denial of this application and would do so.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 5, 1987.