concluding the goal in enacting the current version of Section 309(d) was to provide a more accurate representation of an injured employee’s lost wages, and to eliminate the mischief of an injured employee’s relying on artificially high periods of earnings to receive inflated workers’ compensation benefits
How later courts described this case
- concluding the goal in enacting the current version of Section 309(d) was to provide a more accurate representation of an injured employee’s lost wages, and to eliminate the mischief of an injured employee’s relying on artificially high periods of earnings to receive inflated workers’ compensation benefits
- stating that “in the case of recently hired workers, the statute permits a projection based upon the number of hours the employee was ‘expected’ to work”
- concluding the goal in enacting the current version of Section 309(d
- structure and language of Section 309 make apparent that "a `fair ascertainment' of the employee's wages is the legislative intendment"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that § 309(d) is ambiguous, requiring us to engage in statutory interpretation to fashion a desired result for unfortunate cases such as appellant’s. Like it or not, the statute provides a simple and explicit formula for calculation of wages, and there is no exception for the present scenario; an oversight which leads to a harsh result is not the equivalent of ambiguity. See Scanlon v. DPW, Dept. of Aging, 739 A.2d 635, 638 (Pa. Cmwlth.1999) (statute is ambiguous or unclear if its language is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations).
In general, the Workers’ Compensation Act does not distinguish between part-time and full-time employment. See 77 P.S. § 22 (defining “employe”). Section 309(d) likewise does not make this distinction; for wage calculation purposes, subsection (d) focuses on the length of employment and the amount of compensation. “Employe” and “wages,” as used in § 309(d), are not subject to two or more reasonable interpretations. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its *84 spirit.”); Energy Pipeline Co. v. Pennsylvania Utility Com’n., 541 Pa. 252 , 662 A.2d 641, 644 (1995) (plain words of statute cannot be disregarded where language is free and clear from all ambiguity); MacDougall v. MacDougall 397 Pa. 340 , 155 A.2d 358, 360 (1959) (statute’s plain words cannot be disregarded under pretext of accomplishing good purpose, particularly where language is free and clear from all ambiguity).
It is undisputed appellant, although a student working part-time, was employed by Hannaberry HVAC and received wages for this employment. Under the clear language of the statute, appellant was employed for at least four consecutive, 13-week quarters in the year preceding his injury, and his part-time wages are to be included in the wage calculation. The result is not an equitable one, for a part-time employee who assumes full-time status during the last quarter before an injury receives less than if there had been no prior part-time wages.
The Legislature’s failure to anticipate all potential employment situations does not amount to ambiguity; it simply means there are situations where application of the statutory formula may not yield the result intended. This fact signals a definite need for revision of the statute. 1 However, adjusting this incongruity is a task for the Legislature, not this Court. See Frost v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 337 Pa. 537 , 12 A.2d 309, 310 (1940) (hardship or equity of case cannot override plain words of statute, and legislature, not court, must correct any evil).
While the result in this case is unfortunate, I am reluctant to carve out exceptions to application of the statutory formula, absent ambiguity in the statute. Arguments of unjust or *85 uncontemplated results of a legislative scheme do not amount to ambiguity, and courts should not manufacture ambiguity to avoid a disagreeable result. That said, I echo the hope of the Commonwealth Court “that this appeal would present a situation that would compel just such an adjustment by the General Assembly.” Hannaberry HVAC, at 654.
Chief Justice CAPPY joins this dissenting opinion.
. The Commonwealth Court acknowledged the need for revision, quoting a comment made by Senator Gibson E. Armstrong (R. Lancaster; York) during legislative debate concerning the 1996 amendments:
[Y]ou cannot write a bill that is perfect. I do not think we have ever written a bill here that is perfect. Some areas of this bill will probably need to be adjusted, and if they do, I am here to tell you I will work with anyone to adjust them as quickly as possible.
Hannaberty HVAC v. WCAB (Snyder, Jr.), 767 A.2d 650, 653-54 (Pa. Cmwlth.2001) (quoting Senate Legislative Journal, June 10, 1996, p. 2157).