The opinion
MORRIS, P. J.—I respectfully dissent.
I would affirm the judgment granting the peremptory writ of mandate for the reasons stated by the trial court in its notice of ruling.
The majority interprets Gonzales too narrowly. The rationale of that decision is not limited to cases involving a vested right. Although the court noted that the case involved a fundamental vested right, the conclusion applies with equal force to other significant rights of the employee. The court *207 concluded that “a reasonable reconciliation between the rights of the employee and the employer requires that, where good cause is shown for a brief delay and no prejudice to the employer is shown, relief from default should be given.” (Gonzales v. State Personnel Bd. (1976) 76 Cal.App.3d 364 at p. 367 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 787 ].)
Although the right of an employee to appeal from “a transfer for purposes of punishment” may not be as fundamental as the right to appeal from a dismissal, it is also true that the possibility of prejudice to the employer as a result of the delay is likely to be less.
I agree with the trial court that in providing for administrative investigations, interrogations and appeals, Government Code sections 3303 and 3304 make no distinction between the various kinds of disciplinary actions. The trial court’s reasoning is sound, where the Legislature has recognized the same rights to an administrative hearing “[i]t follows that the same rights to relief from default should be available regardless of the nature of the alleged discipline imposed.”
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 6, 1984. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.