The opinion
STATON, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in result for the following reasons:
1. The clear intent of the legislature has been obscured by a punctilio between two statutes: the before and after syndrome. [IC 35-33-8-5 and IC 35-33-8^4(b) ]. The distinction relied upon is “setting bail” versus revocation of bail “while admitted to bail.” The statutes must be read together.
2. The Majority embraces the statutory concept that the trial court is helpless to reconsider the amount of bail unless one of the conditions expressed in IC 35 — 33—S—5(d)(l—5) has been committed “while admitted to bail.” I disagree. Ray had previously been convicted of stalking the same person less than a year ago. It is clear that the legislature intended to protect the physical safety of potential victims by setting the appropriate amount of bail. It is equally clear that the trial court is not limited only to evidence of acts committed while admitted to bail. The statutes must be read together.
3.Under the proper set of circumstances and where the evidence is clear and convincing, the trial court has the inherent power to revoke the bond of a defendant. United States v. Markowski, 582 F.Supp. 1276 (N.D.Ind.1984). Evidence that Ray had been convicted of stalking the same victim a year earlier is some evidence of instability and disdain for the authority of the court. However, without more, the evidence is insufficient to support a cause for revoking Ray’s bail. See also Haynes v. State, 656 N.E.2d 505 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).
For the above reasons, I concur in result.