stating that error does not require reversal where it is harmless and an evidentiary error is harmless if properly admitted evidence is so overwhelming that no fair-minded juror could reasonably have voted to acquit the defendant
How later courts described this case
- stating that error does not require reversal where it is harmless and an evidentiary error is harmless if properly admitted evidence is so overwhelming that no fair-minded juror could reasonably have voted to acquit the defendant
- finding court in its discretion could refuse to answer juror's question regarding an inability to reach a unanimous verdict and instead respond "You have your instructions. Keep deliberating"
- finding the error in admitting a book entitled “Force of Sex” was harmless where the properly admitted evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming
- in a prosecution for first-degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated unlawful restraint committed against a six-year-old child, the cover of a book found by the police in the defendant's unlocked apartment two days after the crimes were committed entitled, "The Force of Sex," was not shown to be relevant and should not have been admitted by the trial court at the defendant's trial where there was no testimony as to the contents 25 of the book or that the defendant had owned or had read the book
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
The trial court should not have admitted testimony from the state psychologist concerning statements made by defendant during a 1991 court-ordered examination to determine her fitness to stand trial. The statements made by defendant during the fitness examination fell squarely within the terms of section 104 — 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 — 14 (West 1992)), and their admission was specifically prohibited.
Although trial counsel failed to make the appropriate objections to the psychologist’s testimony, admission of that testimony denied defendant her right to a fair trial and constituted plain error. The majority invokes Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 , 97 L. Ed. 2d 336 , 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987), to avoid this conclusion, but nothing in Buchanan legitimizes the introduction at trial and sentencing of statements made by a defendant during a court-ordered fitness hearing where, as here, a statute expressly prohibits their use.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) prohibits the prosecution of a person who is unfit to stand trial. People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, 455 (1994). The legislature has enacted a detailed statutory scheme to ensure that that prohibition is honored, and section 104 — 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an integral part of that scheme. In ruling as it has, the majority has rendered section 104 — 14 a nullity. By so doing, it has taken something that was intended to protect the integrity of the criminal process and subverted it into a trap for defendants who may be suffering from mental or psychological impairments.
From this day forward, any defendant who cooperates with a court-ordered fitness hearing does so at his own peril. Under the majority’s analysis, trial courts will be free to disregard the terms of section 104 — 14 without risk of reversal, even where a timely objection is made, just as long as there is enough other evidence to support a conviction. For my colleagues, it is simply a question of the ends justifying the means. In my view, the concept of a fair trial involves considerably more than that.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.