holding that a potential expert witness "had to show to the trial judge his knowledge and experience in the field to qualify as an expert"
How later courts described this case
- holding that a potential expert witness "had to show to the trial judge his knowledge and experience in the field to qualify as an expert"
- “An inference of constructive knowledge is not sufficient to establish an assumption of risk as a matter of law. Constructive knowledge is not a part of the doctrine. It rather must be shown that there was an actual knowledge on the part of the plaintiff as to the risk involved and an assumption of that risk with such actual knowledge.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. A genius at math cannot deduce the area of a circle without knowing the length of its radius. In like manner Trooper Brown could not have deduced the speed of this dune buggy with any reasonable degree of accuracy for two *906 reasons: first, because he. was not armed with any formula or reasonable evaluative process in which to plug his measurements and observations at the scene, and second, because he did not evaluate patently necessary measurements and observations, unique in this situation, including the character of the taught guy wire which would have behaved like the string of a bow, the dissimilar front and rear tires, and the manner in which the light and open fiber glass body had detached at the time of impact from the small foreign made chassis. There are special and unusual traffic cases such as this just as there are special and unusual medical cases, which require the attention of traffic investigators and doctors with heightened training, skill and experience. This Court spoke my mind on this subject in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kuhlenschmidt, (1941) 218 Ind. 404, 425 , 33 N.E.2d 340, 348-349 , when it said:
"And it seems to us that as the subject of inquiry becomes more technical, involved, or scientific, the trial court, within whose reasonable discretion is the determination of the qualifications of a witness, should exercise greater care in ascertaining that an offered witness is in a position to throw light on the question."
It became evident at the trial that this case posed a puzzle with which the proffered expert witness was not qualified to deal, and that his opinion should have been taken away from the jury. |
Ordinarily I would be content with leaving the weight and credibility of testimony of an expert witness to the trier of fact and the process of cross-examination, and would not dissent here if the witness had actually observed the dune buggy in motion, or had he made observations and measurements at the seene upon which his opinion might reasonably have been grounded. But here I am pressed to the opposite position by the incomplete identification of relevant factual matter and the inability of the witness to demonstrate that he used an accepted and systematic method of reaching his opinion on speed. And finally, as I have studied this case, I am, unlike the majority, unable to raise the inference from this record that the dune buggy may have skidded for a distance of 120 feet as it traversed the roadway. My vote is to reverse and remand for a new trial.
PRENTICE, J. concurs.