explaining that statute altering requirements for obtaining 7 discovery in regards to claims for punitive damages was procedural and therefore was properly applied to claim arising before statute took effect
How later courts described this case
- explaining that statute altering requirements for obtaining 7 discovery in regards to claims for punitive damages was procedural and therefore was properly applied to claim arising before statute took effect
- explaining that statute altering requirements for obtaining discovery in regards to claims * for punitive damages was procedural and therefore was properly applied to claim arising before statute took effect
- noting that Section 21-1-4.1 "does not alter the standard of proof required to recover on a punitive damages claim"
- “We believe the complicity rule to be the better approach, and adopt the rule of the Restatement as the standard as to when punitive damages may be awarded against a principal for acts of his or her agent.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SABERS, Justice
(concurring specially).
I write specially to point out that, despite the statement to the contrary by the majority opinion, the trial court’s decision was not “properly” based on the “Restatement complicity rule.” I also take issue with the majority’s language that:
The facts of this case do not support that ‘Sittner was justified in concluding that Klock was not an unfit person;’ rather, the facts appear to preponderate that Sittner was reckless in employing Klock.
This language appears to improperly apply the wrong test. The test is whether genuine issues of material fact exist. They do exist. See, Wilson, 157 N.W.2d at 21. The majority even says so in the very same paragraph. As correctly stated therein, it is “for the jury, not the court,” or this court to “conclude” whether or not the facts “appear to preponderate” on Klock’s fitness or Sittner’s recklessness.