physician could be liable for injuries sustained by third party injured as result of automobile accident caused by patient
How later courts described this case
- physician could be liable for injuries sustained by third party injured as result of automobile accident caused by patient
- cause of action by injured pedestrian against doctor for failing to diagnose patient’s epileptic condition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UHLENHOPP, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the majority opinion. Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Dieckmann negligently failed to diagnose Norman Lemmon’s condition and negligently advised Lemmon “that he could drive an automobile.” A motion to dismiss is sustainable only if it appears to a certainty the plaintiffs could not recover under any state of facts provable under their petition. Osbekoff v. Mallory, 188 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa). It seems to me that under their petition, plaintiffs could prove facts bringing them within § 311(1)(b) of the Restatement of Torts 2d:
One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results ... to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.
See also Comment b to that section (“Thus it is as much a part of the professional duty of a physician to give correct information as to the character of the disease from which his patient is suffering, where such knowledge is necessary to the safety of the patient or others, as it is to make a correct diagnosis or to prescribe the appropriate medicine.” Italics added.). *581 Cf. Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147 , 160 N.E. 456 ; Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323 , 173 N.W. 663 .
If plaintiffs introduce evidence on trial from which a jury could reasonably find (1) that Dr. Dieckmann negligently advised Lemmon he could drive, (2) that in the exercise of due care Dr. Dieckmann should have expected that members of the public would thereby be put in peril, (3) that Lemmon drove in reasonable reliance upon the advice, (4) that Lemmon suffered a recurrence of his malady, (5) that Lem-mon struck Lena Freese as a result, and (6) that plaintiffs were thereby damaged, then a jury case would be presented against Dr. Dieckmann under § 311, supra. These matters would constitute a state of facts provable under the petition. (As to what is due care or negligence by a physician, see Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685 , 140 N.W.2d 139 .)
The rule of the Restatement is limited to cases involving “physical harm.” Hence it is inapplicable to cases involving financial matters, such as accounting reports or title opinions. See Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa). In the case of an attorney’s title opinion addressed to a client, for example, a third person realizes the opinion was given for the use of the client and not for the third person, and if the third person relies on the opinion he does so at his peril. Not so with a third person standing on the street who is struck by a motorist undergoing a convulsion. The third person does not rely on a doctor’s statement that it is all right for the patient to drive. The patient, who was intended to rely on that statement, relies on it and drives, and the public is thereby endangered.
The Restatement rule does not require that the doctor know the statement is false. All that is required in this connection is that the statement be not true and that t'he doctor “negligently” give it. Restatement, Torts 2d § 311 (1) (b) (“One who negligently gives false information” etc.).
I concur therefore in reversal of the judgment.
REYNOLDSON, HARRIS and Mc-CORMICK, JJ., join in this Concurrence.