holding that “[i]n addition to the obvious requirement that an applicant relying on section 822.3 must show the alleged ground of fact could not have been raised earlier, the applicant must also show a nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the challenged conviction,” that is, the applicant “must show the ground of fact is relevant to the challenged conviction,” and defining “relevant” as “of the type that has the potential to qualify as material evidence for purposes of a substantive claim under section 822.2”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[i]n addition to the obvious requirement that an applicant relying on section 822.3 must show the alleged ground of fact could not have been raised earlier, the applicant must also show a nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the challenged conviction,” that is, the applicant “must show the ground of fact is relevant to the challenged conviction,” and defining “relevant” as “of the type that has the potential to qualify as material evidence for purposes of a substantive claim under section 822.2”
- explaining that “Harrington’s attorney could have used [the alternate suspect] as the centerpiece of a consistent theme that the State was prosecuting the wrong person,” and concluding that this alternate perpetrator evidence might well have led to reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind that Harrington was the murderer, despite a purported accomplice’s testimony that Harrington had a shotgun and was attempting to steal a car at the dealership where the murder took place
- holding substantial evidence clearly supported the district court's findings that the defendant could not have discovered the undisclosed police reports and the recantation evidence "earlier than they were discovered in the exercise of due diligence"
- finding undisclosed police reports and recantation evidence, not discovered within the time for filing a PCR, qualify as material evidence that probably would have changed the trial outcome and support a due process violation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CADY, Justice,
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Harrington’s due process claim is not based on his pretrial lack of knowledge of a potential suspect who had been seen walking a dog and carrying a shotgun near the railroad tracks by the car dealership a few days prior to the murder. Furthermore, Harrington’s claim is not that he did not have knowledge that dog prints were observed at the murder scene. If these were his claims, I would have no disagreement with the majority. Instead, his claim is that the police failed to turn over the written reports of their investigation into the potential suspect. Although suppression by the police of potentially exculpatory information can justify a new trial, it does not in this case because Harrington clearly knew enough about the information independent of the contents of the suppressed police reports to conduct his own investigation and determine its value as a defense.
I am outraged that the police, apparently, failed to turn over the questioned reports. This was a clear violation of Brady. However, due process does not require a new trial unless the suppressed reports would have reasonably altered the outcome of the trial. Although the passage of time, as well as the death of the defense attorney, has cast a cloud of vagueness over much of the trial proceedings, it is undisputed that Harrington and his attorney knew enough about the information contained in the suppressed police reports to examine witnesses at trial about the matter. Moreover, this information was so sensational and so exculpatory that Har *526 rington’s counsel surely would have earnestly pursued the matter independent of any police reports and then formulated a defense around it if it had been warranted. Consequently, I am unable to conclude that the reports would have altered anything at the original trial.
The majority cites two decisions to support its conclusion that the suppression of the reports denied Harrington the essential facts to structure a defense around the suppressed reports. See Mazzan, 993 P.2d at 37; Wilson, 2002 WL 732110 , — So.2d at -. However, in Mazzan the actual police reports were essential to understanding and appreciating the implications of the information. Similarly, in Wilson defense counsel would have had no reason to “expend the time or resources” to locate the witness unless he would have known about the details of their testimony contained in the suppressed reports. In this case, however, there is no dispute that Harrington and his counsel had been made aware of the eerie, suspicious circumstances mentioned in the suppressed reports. Moreover, police did provide defense counsel with a report identifying the potential suspect by name, together with a host of names and addresses of neighbors who had seen the suspicious person. The suppressed police reports were not necessary to understand the significance of this known information or to prod any competent attorney to investigate every aspect of the information.
I believe the majority has attached too much significance to the suppression of the reports, and has elevated the circumstances implicating Gates as the murderer into a sensationalized claim that seemingly vindicates Harrington today, yet was known and rejected by police and Harrington’s own defense counsel twenty-five years ago. The majority exalts the claim far beyond the significance anyone involved in the case gave it twenty-five years ago, including Harrington’s own defense counsel, whose competency was not questioned in this proceeding. The majority now sets aside a twenty-five year old jury verdict and places the State in the difficult position of retrying this case after the passage of two and one-half decades because of a misdeed by the police which, while disconcerting, did not result in prejudice to Harrington. I would conclude the Brady violation is not cognizable in this postconviction relief proceeding. I would otherwise affirm the district court ruling.