holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), which held that any fact used to increase the penalty for a state crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, had to be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, does not apply to criminal cases in which direct appeals were exhausted before Apprendi was decided
How later courts described this case
- holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), which held that any fact used to increase the penalty for a state crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, had to be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, does not apply to criminal cases in which direct appeals were exhausted before Apprendi was decided
- holding that the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not meet the second Teague exception so as to be applied to cases on collateral review, because that decision only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence and does not amount to an error that seriously affects the fairness or reputation of court proceedings
- holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000
- consideration of a waived issue is not barred by section 122 — 3 of the Act, particularly if the State has not argued defendant’s waiver
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lucien v. Briley, 213 Ill. 2d 340 (2004)
Second, plaintiff argues De La Paz is inapplicable to his case, because he raised the equivalent of an Apprendi claim on direct appeal.
The opinion
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
I agree with the following reasoning of the Beachem court:
“Apprendi *** mean[s] that once the defendant serves the prescribed maximum sentence, he or she remains in prison on a charge never made and never proved. And if we acknowledge the defendant remains in prison on a charge never made or proved, we have impugned the integrity of our criminal justice system. It is as if the sentencing judge actually said to the defendant: T have convicted you of a charge never made against you and never heard by.the jury, and I have done it based on the preponderance of the evidence.’ ” People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d 693, 702 (2000).
The fundamental meaning of the sixth amendment’s jury trial guarantee is that all facts essential to impose the level of punishment that a defendant receives must be found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 , 153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 578 , 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2444 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). This was true long before the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Apprendi, at least 202 years before Apprendi to be sure. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 373-74 , 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970) (though expressed from ancient times, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard seems to have developed by 1798 and is now the accepted “ ‘measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must [prove] all the essential elements of guilt,’ ” quoting C. McCormick, Evidence § 321, at 681-82 (1954)). Accordingly, the majority’s decision not to apply Apprendi retroactively is unnecessary and incorrect. The core of the Apprendi holding — the requirement that each element necessary to prove a crime be submitted to the trier of fact for proof beyond a reasonable doubt — is nothing new. The principle has been active for at least two centuries. I believe that the failure to comply with this basic tenet of constitutional law is an error so injurious to our fundamental civil liberties that no sentence meted out in derogation of Apprendi should be allowed to stand. See People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2002) (finding that defendant’s crime was brutal and heinous unconstitutionally made by a trial judge); People v. Thurow, 203 111. 2d 352, 375-78 (2003) (Kilbride, J., dissenting); People v. Crespo, 203 111. 2d 335, 349-51 (2003) (Kilbride, J., dissenting). Through Thurow, Crespo and now the case at bar, the majority has rendered the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee, identified in Apprendi, an illusion in this state. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.