The opinion
CROSBY, J
I respectfully dissent. The workers’ compensation judge found for the applicant. The board disagreed in a divided opinion which clearly applied the wrong standard.
*1045 The majority now propose to resolve the matter at this level on a very sketchy record. No witness testified concerning the employer’s attitude toward the weekend invitation or its policy on the use of dealership cars. We have no idea whether:
(1) The applicant might have been required to drive his demonstrator vehicle as a condition of employment (Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150, 156-157 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 456 , 501 P.2d 1176 ]; State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (McGrew) (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 902, 907 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 39 ]);
(2) The employer intended to underwrite the weekend or differentiate in any way between those who attended and those who did not;
(3) There was a plan to hold business meetings at the gathering.
The answers to the questions above might tip the scales in this case, as could any number of other possible factors. I believe the appropriate disposition would be to remand to the board with directions to apply the correct law (Ezzy v. Worker’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 252 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 90 ]). Not only should the board resolve the question in the first instance but, in light of Ezzy , might well decide to take additional evidence. The board has that power, and this certainly appears to be an appropriate case for its exercise. (Gonzales v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 360, 363 [ 325 P.2d 993 ]; Cal. Workmen’s Compensation Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1973) § 10.34, p. 345.)
Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 22, 1984. Bird, C. J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.