Opinion

Holtz v. Bd. of Com'rs of Elkhart County

  • 560 N.E.2d 645
  • 1990 Ind. LEXIS 199
  • 1990 WL 152295
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Filed
Oct 10, 1990
Status
Published
Author
Dickson
On the bench
Givan, Shepard, Pivarnik, Dickson, Debruler
Cited by
19 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.4%

finding that employee alleged retaliatory discharge claim where he alleged he was terminated in retaliation for bringing deficiencies in bridge inspection procedures to attention of Indiana Attorney General and Department of Highways

How later courts described this case

  • finding that employee alleged retaliatory discharge claim where he alleged he was terminated in retaliation for bringing deficiencies in bridge inspection procedures to attention of Indiana Attorney General and Department of Highways
  • “In so holding we would observe that were we to hold Holtz’ [sic] cause of action sounding in contract, persons in like situations would be without remedy.”
  • considering a case concerning a retaliatory discharge claim brought by a former at-will employee against the county board of commissioners
  • claim for retaliatory discharge subject to the ITCA

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

DICKSON, Justice,

dissenting.

Although noting that the Tort Claims Act is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed, the majority opinion then fails to apply the proper meaning of "strictly construe." In Collier v. Prater (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 497, 498 , this Court held that statutory requirements in derogation of the common law "are to be strictly construed against limitations on a claimant's right to bring suit" (emphasis added). Similarly, in Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Morris (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 468, 473 , we recognized that the Tort Claims Act "must be strictly construed and narrowly applied" (emphasis added).

The immunity provided by the Tort Claims Act applies only to a "loss" which is defined by Ind.Code § 84-4~16.5-2(e):

"Loss" means injury to or death of a person, or damage to property.

The plain and ordinary meaning of this definition connotes nothing more than harm to a person or property. To contort the simple phrase "damage to property" to mean "damages" to a "property right" is contrary to the plain meaning of the words and defies the rule requiring the statute to be construed against limitations on a claimant's right to bring suit.

I find the unanimous opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeals to be fully correct and would adopt and incorporate it by reference pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(8).

DeBRULER, J., concurs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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