finding that the waiver of a workers’ compensation lien must be explicitly stated due to the “integral role the workers’ compensation lien plays in the workers’ compensation scheme” and concluding that “general language” was insufficient “to effect such a waiver”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the waiver of a workers’ compensation lien must be explicitly stated due to the “integral role the workers’ compensation lien plays in the workers’ compensation scheme” and concluding that “general language” was insufficient “to effect such a waiver”
- finding that general release language was insufficient to waive an employer’s statutory right to a workers’ compensation lien in a related suit against a third party on the basis that statutory rights must be explicitly waived
- explaining that “[a] court must initially look to the language of a contract alone, as the language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of the parties' intent”
- noting the difference between waiver and forfeiture; waiver is the “ ‘intentional relinquishment of a known right’ ” (quoting Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307, 326 (2004)), whereas forfeiture is the “ ‘ “failure to make a timely assertion of [that] right.” ’ [Citation.]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:
I agree with the result reached by my colleagues in affirming the appellate court’s decision in the instant case and in overruling Borrowman v. Prastein, 356 Ill. App. 3d 546 (2005). I also agree with the conclusion that a bright-line rule should be adopted so as to require an explicit and affirmative reference to the workers’ compensation lien before it can be waived by settlement language.
I would only add that even in the absence of such a bright-line rule, I do not believe that the general language of paragraph six of the parties’ resignation agreement was intended to encompass Rail Terminal’s workers’ compensation lien. Paragraph six provides that “[t]his Agreement does not constitute an admission by Employer of any liability or wrongdoing but it is intended to resolve in good faith any existing or potential disputes or claims arising out of Employee’s relationship and separation with Employer.” (Emphasis added.) The first clause of the above-quoted sentence suggests — like all of the other language of both agreements — that it is only concerned with claims that Gallagher may have against Rail Terminal. Although the second clause uses some broad language about “any existing or potential disputes or claims,” I believe that this second clause must be read in relation to the first clause. Reading paragraph six in this way leads to the conclusion that the second clause is simply referring to claims that the employee (Gallagher) may have against the employer (Rail Terminal) and not claims that Rail Terminal may have against Gallagher, such as a workers’ compensation hen. This becomes even clearer when all of the language of both documents are read together as a whole, as they must be. See In re Estate of Mayfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d 534, 541 (1997). All of the rights that are specifically mentioned as being waived in both documents are claims that Gallagher may have against Rail Terminal. Paragraph six reinforces this theme by stating that the agreement does not constitute an admission by the employer of any liability or wrongdoing even though it is resolving in good faith existing or potential disputes and claims. In essence, the parties intended that Gallagher receive $150,000 in immediate compensation for permanent partial disability, plus an additional $1 in consideration, in exchange for his resignation and his waiver of any claims against Rail Terminal.