finding under the Magnuson- Moss Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1994)) and the Consumer Fraud Act, the case should be remanded to the circuit court for plaintiff to petition for additional fees because she had to defend the judgment on appeal and remained the prevailing party
How later courts described this case
- finding under the Magnuson- Moss Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1994)) and the Consumer Fraud Act, the case should be remanded to the circuit court for plaintiff to petition for additional fees because she had to defend the judgment on appeal and remained the prevailing party
- listing the elements of common law fraud as: (1) a false representation of a material fact; (2) by a party who knows or believes it to be false; (3) with the intent to induce a plaintiff to act; (4) reliance on the statement by the plaintiff; and (5) injury to the plaintiff as a result of that reliance.
- Fraud may also be based on the omission or concealment of a material fact if accompanied by the intent to deceive under circumstances which create the opportunity and duty to speak.
- in order to preserve issue for review, party must both object at trial and in written posttrial motion
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE QUINN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority in every respect other than as to the issue of whether the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent. The jury’s verdicts that Clifford did not violate the Illinois Motor Vehicle Franchise Act but did commit common law fraud do not necessarily conflict with one another. The jury could have found all of the elements of common law fraud were proven but that the damage sustained prior to delivery of the vehicle had a value which was less than 6% of the manufacturer’s suggested retail price of the vehicle. Indeed, the majority of the evidence presented at trial would support this conclusion. As the verdicts on these two counts are supported by a reasonable hypothesis, they are not “absolutely irreconcilable” and therefore the verdicts are not legally inconsistent. See Tedeschi v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 445, 448-49 , 668 N.E.2d 138, 140 (1996).
While I would reverse the trial court’s holding that the jury verdicts are inconsistent, I concur with the majority that plaintiff is entitled to have only one satisfaction for his injury. Therefore, I concur in all remaining aspects of the majority’s opinion.