police officer discharged from job for failure to work at casino claimed his right to religious freedom was materially burdened
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- police officer discharged from job for failure to work at casino claimed his right to religious freedom was materially burdened
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The opinion
SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur but write separately to make an observation concerning the res judicata effect of the decision of the Seventh Cireuit Court of Appeals rather than any res judi-cata effect of the litigation at the Federal District Court level.
The chronology of events as between the Marshall Superior Court and the Federal District Court is germane to our consideration of the issue. Endres filed his Petition for Judicial Review on May 8, 2001. On December 28, 2001, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Indiana decided that Endres' Civil Rights *1098 claim could proceed in federal court. Thus, Endres was victorious, at least temporarily, at the federal court level. Accordingly, the federal trial court decision could not have a res judicata effect adverse to the interest of Endres. 4 On June 27, 2002, the Marshall Superior Court entered its judgment denying relief to Endres under the Civil Rights Act. It was not until one year later, June 27, 2003, that the Seventh Cireuit held that Endres, as a law enforcement officer, had no viable claim under the Civil Rights Act for the termination of his employment.
Be that as it may, the Seventh Cireuit decision became final while the present appeal was pending before us. That decision, therefore, has res judicata implications to the decision we must make upon this issue before us. See 50 C.J.S., Judgments § 711 (1977) ("a decision of an appellate court will preclude any further action on the same matter between the parties. ...") 5
For the reasons stated I concur.
. The decision of the Federal District Court was not a decision upon the merits of whether Endres was entitled to recover under his civil rights action but could be argued to be a decision upon the merits of the issue finally decided by the Seventh Circuit, ie., whether Endres had a viable civil rights claim at all. It was upon this issue that the Seventh Circuit reversed the Federal District Court.
. The termination litigation in the Marshall Superior Court was not further action because it occurred prior to the Seventh Circuit decision. However, it may be reasoned that the appeal before us is such further action and is subject to the application of the res judicata doctrine.