finding legal causation because a jury could find that it was reasonably foreseeable that chasing a vehicle through residential and commercial suburban streets, knowing that the driver of that vehicle was running stop signs and red lights, “would result in injury to some third person”
How later courts described this case
- finding legal causation because a jury could find that it was reasonably foreseeable that chasing a vehicle through residential and commercial suburban streets, knowing that the driver of that vehicle was running stop signs and red lights, “would result in injury to some third person”
- “[A] negligent act is a legal proximate cause of an injury if the injury is of the type that a reasonable person would foresee as a likely result of his conduct.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE O’MALLEY, dissenting:
It is an unfortunate but unavoidable aspect of police work that, by taking action to protect people and property, often other people and other property are put at risk. Consequently, police officers are called upon to delicately balance the benefit versus the risk of a possible course of action, frequently under urgent circumstances. A police officer who undertakes such a decision with the good intention of protecting the public ought not to be held liable for his honest miscalculation. The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) recognizes this by providing that a police officer acting to enforce a law may be held liable only for “willful and wanton conduct.” 745 ILCS 10/2 — 202 (West 2000). Moreover, “willful and wanton conduct” is defined in the Tort Immunity Act with reference to the police officer’s state of mind: “[A] course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/1 — 210 (West 2000). Although they are stated in the disjunctive, my view is that the juxtaposition of “deliberate intention” with “utter indifference” and “conscious disregard” in the statute indicates that “utter indifference” and “conscious disregard” refer to conduct that is far closer to intentional than negligent, i.e., outrageous conduct. In any case, I see no evidence that Officer Bradford acted with the state of mind of either “utter indifference” or “conscious disregard” for the safety of others or their property. Significantly, the whole point behind chasing the suspect was to protect others and their property.
Although it is true that whether conduct is “willful and wanton” is generally a factual question, Illinois courts have never until today held there to be a factual question as to whether a police chase constituted willful and wanton conduct. Two considerations weigh against holding a police officer personally liable for chasing a suspect in the course of his duty.
The first is that by discouraging police from chasing suspects, we thereby encourage criminals to flee. Hall v. Village of Bartonville Police Department, 298 Ill. App. 3d 569, 573 (1998); Laco v. City of Chicago, 154 Ill. App. 3d 498, 506 (1987). Obviously, fleeing becomes a more attractive option where a criminal, cognizant of the fact he will not be chased, believes that he will avoid capture. In fact, the more serious the crime the criminal has committed, the greater utility in his flight because he avoids a greater punishment by his escape. Moreover, under the majority’s reasoning it appears that the best way to thwart a police chase is to drive particularly fast and especially recklessly. To the extent that we have decided this case in a manner that creates an incentive to flee, we have only frustrated law enforcement and endangered more people.
Second, as recognized by the Tort Immunity Act, law enforcement can be optimally effective only where police make their decisions without fear of personal liability, at least for conduct that is not outrageous. Police officers must take actions that necessarily create a risk to some people in order to remove a greater danger to other people. For example, any police chase or, for that matter, a police officer speeding to the scene of a home invasion has the potential to cause injury to people not otherwise at risk. In deciding how to respond to a threat, police weigh the benefit versus the risk of possible courses of action. Where fear of personal liability becomes a consideration, we skew this calculation and discourage police officers from undertaking optimal but nevertheless somewhat risky courses of action. Pointedly, fear of their own death is enough for police officers to contend with when they decide whether to embark on a course of action; they should not have to worry about losing house and home in a lawsuit because a court later decides that a more conservative course of action would have been more appropriate.
Although there are a myriad of actions a police officer might take to enforce the law, I find it helpful to divide them into two broad categories for the purpose of analyzing this situation. The first category involves dangerous actions that pose little or no risk to the police officer but potentially great risk to others, e.g., shooting at a fleeing suspect in a populated area. The other category involves actions that place the officer in at least as great a risk as innocent bystanders, e.g., chasing a fleeing suspect. Chasing a suspect undoubtedly places innocent bystanders at risk, but nonetheless a cruel twist of fate is still required to place any particular bystander directly in harm’s way. The officer (and the fleeing suspect), however, are in imminent danger at all times during the chase. Consequently, fate plays a much diminished role with regard to the officer’s safety. Saying that Officer Bradford acted with conscious disregard for the safety of others, we certainly also have to say that he acted with even greater conscious disregard for his own safety. There is nothing in the evidence that suggests that Officer Bradford’s motive for putting his life at risk was anything other than the obvious one, to protect the safety of others and their property. In the ordinary circumstance a police officer or any person risking his fife to protect others would be hailed as a hero. Is such a person a wanton villain under the Tort Immunity Act where fate intervenes and a bystander is killed? To my way of thinking there is not so thin a fine between a hero and a villain.
The whole point behind the Tort Immunity Act is that police will not be liable for their honest judgment calls, at least where they are not outrageous. Under the statute, a police officer may be liable only where his conduct shows “utter indifference”'or “conscious disregard” for the safety of others and their property. 745 ILCS 10/1 — 210 (West 2000). When a police officer undertakes a course of action with the purpose of protecting the safety of others or their property, it is extraordinary to say that he has shown “utter indifference” or “conscious disregard” for the safety of others and their property simply because, in our judgment, another course of action or even no action would have been more prudent. A police officer who makes such a judgment call, even if errant, has acted with specific regard for the safety of others, not conscious disregard.
Officer Bradford made a judgment call in the course of his duty. Whether the decisions to give and continue chase were correct at the time that they were made is not relevant here. The point is that the evidence shows that Officer Bradford, in his judgment, thought that they were the right decisions, so much so, in fact, that he put his own life in danger by pursuing this suspect. Officer Bradford’s decisions turned out tragically. Officer Bradford, however, made his decisions in the course of attempting to protect others and their property. The Tort Immunity Act is designed to insulate police officers from liability for exactly this type of honest mistake. I see no evidence that Officer Bradford acted with “conscious disregard” or “utter indifference” to the safety of others or their property. As a result, his conduct could not have been “willful and wanton” as it is defined in the Tort Immunity Act. I believe that the trial court judgment should be affirmed.