“Where an oral contract may be completed in less than a year, even though it is clear that in all probability the contract will extend for a period of years, the statute of frauds is not violated.” Id., 283 N.W.2d at 715.
How later courts described this case
- “Where an oral contract may be completed in less than a year, even though it is clear that in all probability the contract will extend for a period of years, the statute of frauds is not violated.” Id., 283 N.W.2d at 715.
- giving up virtually secured position and pension was sufficient special consideration
- termination of existing employment may give rise to estoppel if coupled with a loss of valuable retirement benefits
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Chires v. Cumulus Broadcasting, LLC, 543 F. Supp. 2d 712 (2008)
91 Mich.App. 254, 258, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979), is inapplicable because it concerns an indefinite term of employment.
The opinion
Mackenzie, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. Although I agree with the majority’s disposition of the statute of frauds issue, I disagree with its treatment of the issue concerning the terminability of the employment contract.
As the majority notes, the general rule, adhered to in Michigan, is that a contract for employment for an indefinite term may be terminated by either party at any time for any reason, absent some special consideration passing from the employee to the employer. Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 79 Mich App 429 ; 262 NW2d 848 (1977), lv gtd on separate grounds, 402 Mich 950h (1978), McMath v Ford Motor Co, 77 Mich App 721, 724 ; 259 NW2d 140 (1977). An employee serving under such contract has no cause of action for damages for wrongful discharge. Milligan v The Union Corp, 87 Mich App 179, 182 ; 274 NW2d 10 (1978). I disagree with the majority that there is sufficient reason to deviate from the general rule in the instant case.
It is true that the protection of a collective bargaining agreement was an enticing feature of employment with the defendant. It is additionally true, however, that the protective features of the agreement were unavailable to the plaintiff until he became a union member, and that such membership was to be delayed until he had been employed by the defendant for a period of 45 days.
One of the protective clauses of the union contract was that an employee could only be discharged "for good cause”. To provide such protec *265 tion to the plaintiff prior to the termination of the 45-day period is to afford the plaintiff one of the protective devices of the contract prior to his having qualified for it. The agreement, however, specifically directs that the employer need not comply with the provisions during the 45-day period, over the course of which an employee is considered probationary.
The majority has apparently adopted the exception to the "fire-at-will” rule which considers the rule inapplicable when a tenured or secured position is being given up. Absent specific Supreme Court directive, I decline to adhere to this position. The approach is clearly contrary to prior case law in this state. According to the Supreme Court in Adolph v Cookware Co of America, 283 Mich 561, 568 ; 278 NW 687 (1938):
"Plaintiff’s proofs, taken as true, showed a contract for permanent employment. Such a contract is for an indefinite period and, unless for a consideration other than promise of services, the employment was terminable at the will of either party. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684 , and cases there cited.
"The action of plaintiff in giving up the practice of his profession was but an incident necessary on his part to place himself in a position to accept and perform the contract and not a price or consideration paid to defendant for the contract of employment.”
See also Lynas v Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich 684 ; 273 NW 315 (1937), Milligan v The Union Corp, supra. A mere detriment to the employee is, by itself, insufficient to serve as consideration; the employer must receive some form of benefit. The relinquishment of his previous position and its incident benefits by the plaintiff was not a bargained-for benefit received by the defendant.
I would affirm.