applying Article 1, Section 12 of our constitution
How later courts described this case
- applying Article 1, Section 12 of our constitution
- the issue of whether certain statutory procedures satisfied due process was a matter of great public importance which would be resolved despite mootness
- appeal by student against school for expulsion became moot when period for which student had been expelled had passed
- appeal by student against pchool for expulsion became moot when period for which student had been expelled had passed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree that the trial court erred in overturning the Board’s decision. I write separately to clarify the basis of my concurrence.
As an initial matter, I believe that In re P.J., 575 N.E.2d 22 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) and Matter of H.L.K., 666 N.E.2d 80 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), trans. granted, both of which the majority discusses at length, are irrelevant to the issue before us. In those cases, this court discussed the tension between the powers granted by the legislature to the school board and the powers of juvenile courts. In the instant case, on the other hand, we are confronted with the appropriate standard to be applied by the courts of this state when reviewing a school board’s disciplinary decisions.
I agree with the majority that the legislature may not restrict the scope of judicial review of certain questions, including the constitutionality of disciplinary decisions made by school authorities. When reviewing such actions, we examine whether the school board adhered to statutorily prescribed procedures, and whether the substance of the *807 action was consistent with minimum due process requirements, as announced in Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93 , 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940).
I am in complete agreement with the majority’s conclusions that the Board adhered to the applicable procedural guidelines, and that the expulsion here was neither arbitrary nor groundless. In reaching the latter conclusion, the majority observes that school officials are in a superior position to determine what actions are reasonably necessary to maintain order and promote learning in our schools. I emphasize here my view that this principle should guide our courts when reviewing the substance of school board disciplinary actions.
Subject to the above clarification, I concur.