referring to Title VII cases in interpreting the “bona fide occupational qualification” provision of the MHRA
How later courts described this case
- referring to Title VII cases in interpreting the “bona fide occupational qualification” provision of the MHRA
- “To the extent there exists an identity of purpose and objectives as between the Maine and federal [antidiscrimi-nation] provisions, reference to the latter in construing the former is entirely appropriate.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WATHEN, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority. Elemental justice requires that before one person’s right to employment must yield to another’s right of privacy, it must be determined that it is not possible for both to exist in relative harmony. Even reorganization of the work place should be considered if that be practicable and necessary to permit both their due. I am unable to agree, however, with the decisional technique used by the majority to establish this fundamental proposition. Specifically, I reject the notion that “the Maine legislature — by adopting provisions that generally track the federal antidiscrimination statutes — intended the courts to look to the federal case law to ‘provide significant guidance in the construction of our statute.’ ” Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn, Me., 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (1979). I would re-examine the legislative history upon which this Court relied in first adopting this statement before giving it further application. See Maine Human Rights Commission v. Local 1361, United Paperworkers Int’l Union, Me., 383 A.2d 369 (1978) (Court relied solely upon legislative history pertaining to an earlier unsuccessful effort to enact the Maine Human Rights Act).
It is difficult to articulate the distinction between the appropriate and routine review of ease law from other jurisdictions and the establishment of federal case law as a source of “significant guidance.” The former process involves consideration of the reasons found persuasive by other courts when faced with a similar issue, while the latter involves accepting and yielding to the results achieved by a different jurisdiction. I am unwilling to assume, in the absence of authoritative legislative history, that the Maine legislature intended that the courts accept the subservient role of locating and following binding precedent in other jurisdictions. Neither can I accept that the legislature intended to encumber Maine law with every rule pronounced by a federal court.
The majority responds with justification that they have no intent to abandon their obligation to interpret and construe the Maine Human Rights Act. Notwithstanding that assurance, discrimination law in *347 Maine to date has involved the adoption of rigid federal formulations and burden shifting devices, with little discussion of the wisdom of the underlying rationale. The seductive nature of this process is demonstrated by this Court’s adoption of the federal conception of “clear and convincing proof” in Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn, Me., 425 A.2d 990 , 996 n.3 (1981). While the Court there recognized that Maine law differed on that point, it seemed to assume that any deviation from federal law, no matter how minor, was not to be permitted.
In my judgment, such inflexible adherence to federal case law is not only unnecessary, it is unwise in that it tends to short circuit the traditional process of statutory construction. If every decision in a claim of discrimination is to start with the answer provided by the federal courts, the Maine Human Rights Act will not long remain responsive to the particular needs and circumstances of the people of the State of Maine.