recognizing that a criminal defendant may present evidence "if the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State's case"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that a criminal defendant may present evidence "if the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State's case"
- finding that applica tion of the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to medical disciplinary proceedings does not violate due process or equal protection
- finding that applica *103 tion of the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to medical disciplinary proceedings does not violate due process or equal protection
- re-viewing court “has no power to act independently as an administrative tribunal or to substitute its judgment for that of the agency”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PASHMAN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion except insofar as it remands the case to the State Board of Medical Examiners to reconsider the sanction of license revocation. I would simply reinstate the State Board order of revocation.
The majority opinion recognizes that the test for judicial review of administrative sanctions is whether, under the circumstances of the case, the punishment is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock one’s sense of fairness. Ante at 578. The majority also recognizes that license revocation has frequently been upheld by courts when physicians have been found to have sexually abused their patients. Ante at 578-579.
The State Board of Medical Examiners unanimously recommended the penalty of license revocation. We should defer to this administrative decision. I understand the majority’s concern for procedural fairness. I agree that it was wrong for the Board to have determined to revoke Polk’s license before hear *581 ing from his attorney. However, the mitigating circumstances would have to be substantial indeed to warrant anything less than license revocation in a case such as this. Polk’s attorney did get a chance to urge those circumstances and the Board quickly decided that the new information did not warrant reconsideration of the penalty.
I see absolutely no reason to reverse the Board’s determination or to order it to reconsider its decision. The Board heard the relevant evidence and concluded that Dr. Polk had “grossly exploited” his young patients, “denied the reality of their concerns,” and “surreptitiously manipulated them] to satisfy his own lascivious interests.” Revocation of his license is certainly not shocking under these circumstances. Sexual abuse of one’s patients is itself a shocking breach of professional ethics. Because license revocation is not unreasonable, I dissent.
Justice CLIFFORD joins in this dissent.
For modification and remandment—Justices SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK and O’HERN-4.
Dissenting in part, concurring in part—Justices PASHMAN and CLIFFORD—2.