holding that the quantum of evidence necessary to raise an affirmative defense is that the evidence must be sufficient to raise an issue of fact for the jury creating a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt
How later courts described this case
- holding that the quantum of evidence necessary to raise an affirmative defense is that the evidence must be sufficient to raise an issue of fact for the jury creating a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt
- quantum of evidence necessary to raise an affirmative defense is sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact for the jury creating a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, dissenting:
I think that the appellate court correctly determined that the evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense, and so I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reverses that determination. In all jurisdictions, unless the State’s evidence raises the issue of the defendant’s sanity, the defendant has the burden of introducing evidence which does so. Some jurisdictions require that a defendant introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt before the issue goes to the jury. (See, e.g., Robinson v. State (1968), 249 Md. 200 , 238 A.2d 875 , cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928 , 21 L. Ed. 2d 265 , 89 S. Ct. 259 ; Sallavirta v. State (Fla. App. 1968), 210 So. 2d 487 ; West v. State (Okla. Crim. 1967), 433 P.2d 850 .) Other jurisdictions require only that there be “some evidence” in order to raise the issue. (See, e.g., Gordon v. United States (5th Cir. 1971), 438 F.2d 858 , 885; United States v. Currier (2d Cir. 1969), 405 F.2d 1039 ; State v. Newson (1969), 183 Neb. 750 , 164 N.W.2d 211 .) The reasonable doubt test and the some evidence test are separate and distinct tests which place different burdens upon a defendant. Annot., Modern Status of Rules as to Burden and Sufficiency of Proof of Mental Irresponsibility in Criminal Case (1968), 17 A.L.R.3d 146 ; W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 48 (1972).
In Illinois, the common law rule was that a defendant had to introduce evidence that raised a reasonable doubt. (People v. Robinson (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 162 ; People v. Skeoch (1951), 408 Ill. 276 ; People v. Patlak (1936), 363 Ill. 40 .) The common law, however, was replaced by section 3 — 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which is as follows:
“(a) ‘Affirmative defense’ means that unless the State’s evidence raises the issue involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, must present some evidence thereon.
(b) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense is raised then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the offense.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 3 — 2.
The statute expressly provides that the defendant must introduce only “some evidence.” The “some evidence” test was well established and recognized at the time this statute was enacted (Flowers v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 151 , 139 N.E.2d 185 ; Annot., 17 A.L.R.Sd 146, 172 (1968)), and the language used in the statute clearly evidences acceptance of this test.
The majority relies on People v. Smothers (1973), 55 Ill.2d 172 , to support the conclusion that the defendant must introduce evidence which raises a reasonable doubt of his sanity. Smothers did indeed apply the reasonable-doubt test. The primary concern of the court in that case, however, was with the contentions advanced by the prosecution which were:
“A. Evidence of irrational behavior, standing alone will not support the defense of insanity.
B. The defense of insanity is not raised until it is placed in issue by the introduction of opinion testimony offering affirmative evidence of legal insanity as defined by statute.”
In mentioning the reasonable doubt test, the court relied solely upon this court’s decisions under the common law, and the opinion was not concerned with the effect of the statute’s use of the term “some evidence.”
The majority opinion also relies upon the Committee Comments to section 3 — 2 of the Criminal Code. I find this reliance unconvincing, since the legislature used the term “some evidence,” which then and now has a meaning that is clearly distinct from reasonable doubt. Moreover, the commentary is patently inaccurate. It begins: “The Committee did not care to state how much evidence should be required.” Yet the Committee did state how much evidence was required — some evidence. If the Committee had not cared to state a standard, it could have taken the approach adopted by the Model Penal Code (sec. 1.13, Comment (Ten. Draft No. 4, 1955)), and used the word “evidence” standing by itself. The Committee Comments to section 3 — 2 continue: “It is obvious, however, that unless such evidence is sufficient to warrant submitting the issue to the jury, and to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the offense charged, it will not be of substantial benefit to him." (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, sec. 3 — 2, at 193 (Smith-Hurd 1972).) This is not at all obvious to me. A requirement that a defendant produce only some evidence of insanity in order to place upon the prosecution the burden of proving him sane beyond a reasonable doubt is not the same as a requirement that he produce enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt in order to achieve the same result. The two requirements involve the difference between some evidence, and enough evidence to require, if unrebutted, a directed verdict in the defendant’s favor. That is a significant difference to a defendant and also to a trial judge who must determine whether to instruct the jury that before the defendant can be convicted the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the commission of the offense.